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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the term ''dumping" has been used to refer to the export sales of goods
at a price lower than the market price at home. ' As a form of international price
discrimination, merchandise may well be sold in one foreign market at a price lower than
that for which the same goods are sold in a different market, be it domestic or another
foreign export market. But, antidumping laws typically define the practice, prohibit it,
provide for a penalty in cases where it nonetheless occurs, and establish an administrative
procedure for determmmg in specific cases whether dumping has occurred and what
penalty to impose.
Many scholars and experts have argued for" or against dumping, but the
internationally recognized principles about dumping are clear ; ( 1 ) dumping is unfair and
1
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John Eatwell, et al The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (The Stockton Press, 1987), Vol 1,
p.937.
It is notable that World Trade Organization (hereinafter, "WTO") does not make a direct definition for
"dumping", but simply states that "a product is to be considered as being dumped , i.e. introduced into
the commerce of another country at less than its normal value". Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (hereinafter "Antidumping
Agreement"), art.2.1.
Defenders of antidumping law say that the law is merely to provide customs remedy in the form of
additional duty to offset the pernicious practice - price discrimination that injures domestic commerce
See. Perry, Trade Laws A/m to Ease Dislocations and Counteract Unfair Practices, 9 Business America
3 (Dec 8, 1986), cited in Thomas J Schoenbaum , Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and the
GA TT : An Evaluation and a Proposal for a UnifiedRemedy for Unfair International Trade, University
of Georgia, School of Law, 1987 p 25
See, Schoenbaum, saying that [antidumping law] is an overly legalistic trade law that has lost its
original purpose and is almost always used for protectionist purpose Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1.
See also, Ross Denton, (Why) Should Nations Utilize Antidumping Measures '!', 1 1 Mich J Int'l L 224
(1989), saying that the United States antidumping rules as currently operated are protectionist /c/at
272.
See generally, Robert W McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Lohs, 13 New J Int'I L &Bus
491,492(1993)
unlawful if it threatens or causes material injury to an industry in the export market,^ and
(2) dumping may be regulated by antidumping measures which should not be abused as a
protectionist measure.^
Indeed, regulating predatory dumping' and establishing an international regime for
curbing abuse of the antidumping measure has been, and contmues to be one of the
major concerns of the international trade talks convened under the auspice of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)/
As of the end of 1997, 29 of the 132 member countries of the WTO had some form of
antidumping regime in operation.*^ Most of the antidumping measures were taken by
developed countries, with the United States leading in the number of measures
5
7
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (hereinafter, "GATT")
J. Bhagwati believes that trade remedies (including antidumping mechanism) "have legitimate roles to
play in a free trade regime", and proposes "to minimize the capture of antidumping mechanism by
protectionist for the purpose of harassment and trade restriction". J. Bhagwati, Protectionism, MIT
Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 48, cited in J.Miranda et al, infra note 8, at 62.
See, J.Miranda et al, infra note 8, at 61, saying that the question about antidumping is how to make sure
it be used appropriately and immunized as much as possible against being used as protectionism.
See also, Denton, supra note D/, at 237.
Predatory dumping occurs when a foreign firm temporarily discriminates in favor of foreign buyers to
lower the market price, win market share, and eliminate competitors, before raising its prices after the
competition is no longer in the market Some companies, however, may desire to gain market share
even if they are not able to completely drive competition from the market and raise prices to recover the
initial loss. Peter H. Lindert, International Economics 183 (8th ed. 1986), cited in Robert H. Lantz, The
Search for Consistency : Treatment ofNonmarkel Economies in Transition under United States
Antidumping and Countenxiiling Duty laws, 10 Am.U.J.Int'l L.P.993,997(1995).
Though the WTO ministerial meeting held in Seattle early December 1999 has ended without reaching
an agreement on the agenda for talks in the coming years, the potential areas proposed at the meeting for
discussion were ; Agricultural goods. Services, Dumping, Electronic commerce, WTO transparency and
Labor standards
See, Potential Areas of Discussion, Washington Post, Nov 30, 1999, at E03.
< http://newslibrary krmediastream.com/cgi-bin/search/wp >
This is the number of countries, counting the 12 EC member countries as one, having made
antidumping investigation(s) during the period 1987-1997. See, Jorge Miranda, Raul A.Torres, Mario
Ruiz, Ihe International Use ofAntidumping : 1987-1997, 32(5) Journal of World Trade 5, 7(1998).
WTO Annual Report 1998.
invocated, which lends support to the criticism that the United States has wielded the
antidumping law for the purpose of protecting its noncompetitive domestic industry.'"
Attendant to this criticism, and taking the United States antidumping law as a typical
model law embodying the Antidumping Agreement, this paper will first look at the
evolution of antidumping law in the United States and its operational scheme. Then this
paper will analyze the United States antidumping law in substantive matters examining
whether and how unfair the United States antidumping policy is. ' ' Then, this paper will
next analyze the necessity of maintaining the antidumping regime and an appropriate
alternative to the antidumping law under the international trade order governed by the
World Trade Organization.
9
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During the period of 1987-1998, there were 2,383 cases of antidumping investigation initiated by 35
countries: United States (411; 17.2%), Australia (395; 16.6%), EC (374; 15.7%), Mexico (196;
8.2%), Canada (195 ; 8.2%), South Africa (128), Brazil (113), Argentina (105), India (86), New Zealand
(61), Korea (56), Turkey (33), Colombia (26), Poland (25), Israel (22), Venezuela (20), Indonesia (20),
Peru (16), Malaysia (14), Finland (13), Philippines (13), Sweden (1 1), Chile (1 1), Austria (9), Egypt (7),
Thailand (6), Japan (4), Costa Rica (2), Singapore (2), Czech Republic (2), Nicaragua (2), Panama (2),
Guatemala (1), Ecuador (1), Trinidad & Tobago (1). For more details, see. Table 1, at 43.
In the same period, 1, 164 cases of definitive antidumping measures were taken by 28 countries:
United States (284, 24.4%), EC (212, 18.2%), Canada (147; 12.6%), AustraHa (134, 11.5%), Mexico
(88), Argentina (47), Brazil (47), South Africa (40), New Zealand (33), Korea (27), India (18), Turkey
(13), Colombia (9), Finland (8), Malaysia (8), Chile (7), Israel (7), Peru (6), Indonesia (6), Egypt (6),
Venezuela (4), Thailand (3), Austria (2), Japan (2), Singapore (2), Philippines (1), Sweden (1),
Poland(l), Guatemala (1). For more detailed statistics, see, Table 2, at 44
See, Denton, supra note D/, at 272.
From January 1995 (when the new international trade order ofWTO launched) to 1999, 22 cases of
dispute on antidumping duty were brought to the dispute settlement mechanism under WTO/DSU
(Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes). United States was
involved in 10 cases
,
8 cases as defendant, 2 cases as plaintiff.< http://www.wto.org/ddf/en/
members_index.html> (visited on Jan. 31, 2000).
SECTION II
OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Purpose of United States Antidumping Law
Under the United States antidumping law, dumping is defined as the sale of foreign
goods in the United States at less than fair value or below the cost of production.'^ To
offset the dumping, antidumping duty is imposed in the amount by which the normal
value of the merchandise exceeds its export price.'
The basic purpose of United States antidumpmg law is to mamtain "fair pricing" of
imports from abroad,'^ thereby leveling the playing field between foreign and United
States manufacturers.'^ More specifically. United States antidumping law pursues three
main goals:
( 1
)
to protect domestic industry and jobs;
(2) to prevent dumping into the United States altogether; and
(3) to avoid the arbitrary application of unfair trade laws by foreign countries against
United States exporters.'^'
'^ See, Glossary of Terms < http://www.ita.doc.gov/import_admin/records/glossary.html >(hereinafter,
"Glossary of Terms") (visited Dec. 7, 1999).
'-^ TaritTActof 1930, 19U.S.C. i}1677b(a) (Supp 1 1998).
'"* See, Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effect ofand Trends in Executive Policy and Court ofInternational Trade
(CTT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-market Economy (NMKj of the People's
Republic ofChina, 10 NY Int'l L Rev 177, 178 (1997)
'^ See, Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency : Treatment ofNonmarket Economies in Transition
under {Inited States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty laws, 10 Am.U J Int'l L. P.993,999(1995).
'^' See, Lantz,, supra note 15, at 999
B. History of United States Antidumping Law
The United States Congress enacted their first antidumping law as part of the
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Revenue Act of 1916 (1916 Act). The Congress has taken this action to counter the
alleged German predatory dumpmg during the World War I, and provided crimmal
sanctions and treble damage penalties for any person who sells or imports articles within
the United States; provided that, (i) the articles are sold or imported at a price
substantially less than market value or wholesale price, and (ii) such acts are done with
the intent of damaging an industry in the United States.'^ Since it was a criminal statute,
perpetrators could only be found guilty upon a finding that there was an intent to harm or
destroy an industry in the United States or to prevent such an industry from being
formed." The 1916 Act, however, was seldom invoked, ^' as it was nearly impossible to
prove the intention of the foreign company to dump its products into the United States.
The 1916 Act has never been used by the court as the basis for granting damages in any
litigation.^^
'^ Revenue Act ofl916, Ch. 463, 801, 39 Stat. 756, 798 (1916),
See, Stephen F Moller, Free Irade Realism in the International Market : Towards a Sensible,
Privately-Enforced Antidumping Statute, 33 Santa Clara L. Rev. 931, 941, note 35 (1993), citing
Steven D Irwin, Revitalizing A Private Right ofAction In Antidumping Cases , 17 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus, 847, 848(1985).
^^ See, Robert W McGee, 77?^ Case to Repeal the Antidumping Lcims, 13 New J Int'l L &Bus 491,
492(1993)
'^ See, MoWqx, supra note 17, at 941.
See, also Lantz, supra note 15, at 999-1000, citing Greyson Bryan and Dominique Guy Boursereau,
Antidumping Law in the European Communities and The United States: A Comparative Analysis, 18
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 631, 665 (1985).
^° See, McGee, supra note 18, at 492.
There was only one unsuccessful prosecution under the 1916 Act for the first fifty years. See, Michael S.
Knoll, United States Antidumping Law : The Case for Reconsideration, 22 Tex Int'l L.J. 265, 268, note
22(1987), cited in McGee, supra note 18, at 492.
^^ See, McGee, supra note 18, at 493.
See also, Steven F Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying ofMarket Share, 42 Stan.L.Rev.695,726
(1990).
6Thus, there was demand for another antidumping law that would be civil in nature
and lower the level of proof required to convict the accused. The result is the
Antidumping Act of 1921 .' Much of the statute in the 1916 Act was replaced by the
Antidumping Act of 1921/ but some remaining paragraphs,"^ long regarded as extinct,
came back to life recently in a few cases,^ ' causing disputes to be broght before the WTO
for settlement."
The Antidumping Act of 1921 introduced many of the concepts contained in the
present antidumping statute."^ The 1921 Act introduced such concepts as "injury
determinations, purchase price, exporter's sale price ... foreign market value" ' and the
structure of two agency administrations under the statute. ' The 1921 Act served as the
^^ See, McGee, supra note 1 8, at 493
^'^ Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub L.No 67-10, 42 Stall 1.
^^ 15 U.S.C.§ 71-77.
^^ Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 26 F Supp 2d 1022 (S.D.Ohio 1998),
Geneva Steel Co. v. Ranger Steel Supply Corp., 980 F Supp. 1209 (D Utah 1997),
Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Minehea Co., 892 F. Supp. 347 (D N H. 1995).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.Indu.s. Co., 513 F.Supp.UOO 475 U.S.514 (1986),
See, McGee, supra note 18, at 492, ciXmg Managing Dumping In Global Economy, 21 Geo.Wash.J.Int'l
L &Econ. at 51 1, note 50(1988).
" The European Communitv (WT/DS136/1 et al.) and Japan ( WT/DS162/1 et al ) each brought the 1916
Act to the WTO/DSB
While the United States might have the ability to "grandfather" the 1916 Act as part the WTO
agreement, it did not do so The EC and Japan are likely to win the disputes, finding the remaining
articles of the 1916 Act inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against
Unfair International Trade Practices, SE06 ALI-ABA 337, 385 (1999)
^^ See, Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, tit. II, 42 Stat. 11-15, 19 U.S.C. 160 (repealed 1979) [current
version at 19 U.S.C. 1673 (1994)].
See, Lantz, supra note 15, at 1000, footnote 29, citing Greyson Bryan and Domonique Boursereau,
Antidumping Loh' in the European Communities and The United States: A Comparative Analysis, 18
Geo Wash. J Int I L. & Econ. 631, 666 (1985).
''Id
The bifurcated administrative process was a result of a 1954 amendment to the 1921 Act, which
transferred the responsibility for determining injury from the Treasury Department to the United States
Tariff Commission (presently the International Trade Commission). The Treasury Department remained
responsible for the determination of sales at less than fair value until the enactment of the Trade
7Statutory basis for investigation of alleged dumping practices until it was replaced by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
After the World War II, the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
established to formulate a new order in international trade. GATT attempted to "promote
international trade by negotiating multilateral agreements to lower tariffs, to reduce or
eliminate non-tariff barriers, and harmonize the remedies available for unfair trade
practices such as dumping. " The condemning of dumping as an unfair trade practice
under GATT^^ provided a basis for United States antidumping law.^^ A separate
Antidumping Code was adopted by the members ofGATT in 1968 and amended in 1979
during the Tokyo Round of international trade talk. In line with the revised GATT
antidumping code, the United States Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of
1979,^ which replaced the Antidumping Act of 1921, inserting a new title VII into the
Tariff Act of 1930. Title VII implemented the provisions of the GATT agreement on
antidumping. Additionally, the 1979 Act removed responsibility for making sales-less-
than-fair-value determinations from the Department of Treasury and turned it over to the
Department of Commerce. Further revisions to United States antidumping law were
Agreements Act of 1979. See, Lantz, supra note 15, at 1000, footnote 29, citing Michael S. Knoll,
United States Antidumping Law: The Casefor Reconsideration, 22 Texas In'tl L.J 265, 269 (1987).
'^ Lantz, supra note 15, at 1000
Article VI ofGATT, adopted in 1947, reads that
,
[T]he contracting parties recognize that dumping, —
,
is to be condemned if it causes or threatens to an established industry— or materially retards the
establishment of a domestic industry
See, Christopher M Barbuto, inward Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An International
Trade Analogue to Robinson-Patman, 62 Fordham L Rev 2047, 2068(1994)
^^ PL 96-39 July 26, 1979, 93 Stat 144, 96th Congress - First Session Convening January 15, 1979, (HR
4537).
'' Id
''Id
-JO
made by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988."' The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT^*^'
required further changes in the antidumping rules and was incorporated into United
States law through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in 1995.^' As a signatory to
GATT, the Antidumping Code, and the 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
ofGATT, the United States has implemented antidumping statutes consistent with these
agreements.'*^
In addition to antidumping laws. United States industries have a variety of trade
remedy options available. However, the perennial reductions in general tariff rates
through the trade talks under GATT/WTO have led to the increased use of non-tariff
barriers, principally antidumping laws.^^
^^ Title VI of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. PL 98-573, October 30, 1984, 99 Stat 2948, 98th Congress
- Second Session Convening January 23, (HR 3398)
39
40
Title I, Subtitle C, part 2 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. PL 100-418, August
23, 1988, 102 Stat 1 107, 100th Congress - Second Session Convening January 25, (HR 4848)
See, supra note 1
.
^^ Title II of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. PL 103-465, December 8, 1994, 108 Stat 4809, 103rd
Congress - Second Session Convening January 25, 1994
,
(HR 5110)
42
19 use § 1673-75 (1994) and their relevant regulations.
"* Other trade remedies can be summarized as follows
;
(1) 19 use. § 2251-53, authorizing the President to impose temporary import restrictions where the
product "is being imported ... in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury, or the threat thereof to the domestic industry" producing a like product
;
(2) 19 use §2436, authorizing the President to impose temporary duties on imports from Communist
countries where such imports are causing market disruption
,
(3) 19 use. s 2271, providing for various kinds of aid for workers and firms adversely affected by
increased import competition
;
(4) 19 use. § 1337, authorizing the International Trade Commission to issue exclusion orders and
cease and desist orders in cases of unfair import practices and/or imports that infringe a US patent,
copyright, or trademark ;
(5) 19 use. § 241 1, mandating action by the United States Trade Representative, subject to direction
by the President, in cases where a foreign practice or policy violates an agreement with the United
States or is unjustifiable and burdens U.S. commerce.
See, Michael Y. Chung, U.S. Antidumping Laws : A Look at the New Legislation, 20 N.C.J.Int'l L.&
Com Reg 495,496(1995), citing J Bhagwati, International Trade Issues for the 90s, 8 B.U.Int'l.L.J 199,
199(1990), and stating that;
[T]he postwar decline of tariffs has focused our minds now on nontariff barriers. And the trade
C. Administration of United States Antidumping I.aw
The International Trade Administration, within the Department of Commerce
("Commerce" or "Commerce Department"), is the administrating authority for United
States antidumping law and is responsible for making the determination of whether less-
than-fair-value sales are occurring, ^ i.e. whether imports are being dumped. On the other
hand, the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission"), an
independent regulatory agency, makes the determination whether a United States
industry is materially injured by reason of such sales at less than fair value. '*^'
In determining if sales are being made at less than fair value, the Department of
Commerce generally compares the United States price of the subject merchandise to the
normal value of the merchandise in the foreign firm's domestic market. As an
alternative, where the merchandise is not sold in the foreign firm's domestic market, the
Department of Commerce will use the price of the merchandise in a third market. If this
is not possible, as a last resort, the Department of Commerce will utilize a "constructed
value" as the normal value for comparison with the export price. ^'^ If the Department of
experts know that administered protection, operating through the unfair use of the "unfair trade"
mechanisms such as countervailing duties (CVDs) aimed at foreign subsidies and anti-dumping
(AD) duties, is now the favorite weapon of the protectionists.
^' 19U.S.C. §1673(1) (1994); 19 U.SC §1677( 1) ( 1994),
See, The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension
Agreements, USITC Pub 2900, Inv No.332-344, at 2-1 to 2-7 (June 1995) See, infra notr 190
< www usitc gov/wais/ reports/arc/w2900 html >
^ 19 use §1673(2) (1994); 19 U.SC §1677(2) (1994) See, USITC Pub 2900, .s7//^ra note 45.
"*' The term 'subject merchandise' refers to the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope of an
antidumping investigation or review 19 U S C §1677(25) Generally, the Commerce describes the
subject merchandise in Appendix III to the questionnaire to the foreign respondent. Glossary of Terms.
^^ 19 use. §1673 (1994 &Supp III 1997)
""^ The constructed value is the sum of ( I) the cost of materials and fabrication of the subject merchandise,
(2) selling, general, and administrative expenses and profit in the comparison market, and (3) the cost of
packing for exportation to the United States. 19 U.S.C. §1677b(e). Glossary of Terms.
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Commerce finds that dumping occurred, it will set a dumping margin in terms of
percentage equal to the average amount by which foreign market value exceeds United
States price/'
The injury determination rendered by the International Trade Commission takes into
account factors such as profits, productivity, market share, depression of prices, volume
of imports, return on investment, and utilization of production capacity.^ Material injury
is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.""' Finding
a threat of material injury requires determining whether further dumped imports are
imminent and whether material injury will result unless an order is issued or a suspension
agreement is accepted.^ It is not sufficient for the threat to be based upon mere
conjecture or supposition/"
Upon affirmative findings of dumping by the Department of Commerce and of
material injury by the International Trade Commission, the Department of Commerce
issues an antidumping order directing that duties equivalent to the amount of dumping
margin be levied in addition to the normal duties already imposed on such imports. ^^ All
imported merchandise covered by the order is subject to a cash deposit upon entry equal
to the amount of the dumping margin.^^' The antidumping duty is paid by the importer to
the Treasury and not to the domestic producer who was determined to have been
^^ Dumping margin is defined as "the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price or
constructed export price of the subject merchandise " 19 U.S.C. §1677(35)(A), Glossary of Terms.
^' 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(BHC).
" 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(A).
" 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(F)(ii).
''Id.
" 19 use. §1673
'^ 19 use. §1673b(d)(l)(B).
11
injured.^'' Once the duty is imposed, the Department of Commerce reviews the
antidumping duty order at least once every twelve months. ^*^ The Department of
Commerce and the International Trade Commission shall also review the antidumping
duty if there is a change in the circumstances sufficient enough to warrant a review/''^
Antidumping duty orders must be revoked after five years of application unless the
revocation would likely lead to the continuation or recurrence of both dumping and
material injury. ^*^
See, J.Wesley Bailey, Trade Law: The Protectionist Use of Antidumping Laws - Should the Law he
changed .?
,
7 Fla.J.lnt'l L.433, 436 (1992), citing Roger P. Alford, Why a Private Right of Action
Against Dumping Would Violate GAT'T 66 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 696, 701 (1991), to argue that ;
[A] private right of action would rightly enable a domestic producer injured by dumped
products to recover for damages done to its business through retroactive application of the
duty and payments directly to the injured producer. This might also act as a deterrent to the
exporters who test and circumvent the antidumping prohibitions through evasive activities
such as "hit and run" dumping, inventory dumping, short lifecycle dumping, and
diversionary dumping, since retroactive damages would remove the risk-free, no lose aspect
of dumping currently.
58
59
60
19U.S.C. §1675 (a).
19U.S.C. §1675 (b).
19U.S.C. §1675 (c)(1)
SECTION III
APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF UNITED STATES
ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Determination of Dumping
Under the United States antidumping law, the Department of Commerce is the
administering authority for determining the existence of dumping and calculating
dumping margin.^'
Dumping is found to exist if a foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the
United States at less than its fair value/'' Dumping margin is defined as the amount by
which the normal value exceeds the export price or constructed export price of the subject
merchandise.
1. Fair Value
Department of Commerce determines whether the subject merchandise is being sold
in the United States at less than fair value by comparing the weighted average of the
normal values of the merchandise to the weighted average of the export prices for
comparable merchandise, or by comparing the normal values of individual transactions to
the export prices of individual transactions for comparable merchandise/"^
^' 19 use. § 1677(1).
" 19U.S.C. § 1673(1).
" 19U.S.C. § 1677(35).
^^ But, the Department may determine by comparing the weighted average of the normal values to the
export prices of individual transactions for comparable merchandise, if.
12
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It is notable that there is no clear definition for fair value in the antidumping law while
it is the basis to start with for finding the existence of dumping/'^ It is, however,
understood from the process of dumping investigation, that the fair value is a preliminary
estimate of the normal value determined by the Department of Commerce with
administrative discretion/'' Additionally, the fact that the fair value is not prescribed in
the Antidumping Agreement as a requirement for determination of dumping could also
support the assumption that fair value is simply for administrative convenience in
executing the United States antidumping law.
2. Normal Value
Normal value is the basis for calculating dumping margin. ' Normal value can be
defined as the price at which the foreign like product is tlrst sold for consumption in the
exporting country. ' If such a price is not available or improper for comparison with
export purpose, the Department of Commerce may set the normal value at the price at
(i) there is a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among
purchasers, regions, or periods of time, and
(ii) the Department explains why such differences cannot be taken into account using an average-to-
average or transaction-to-transaction method. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f- 1(d)(1)(B).
19 C.F.R. §351 . 102 simply states that ["F]air value" is a term used during an antidumping investigation,
and is an estimate of normal value. But historically and for all practical purposes, "fair value" and
"normal value" are synonymous. Earlier versions of the U.S. antidumping statutes referred to "fair
value", and this phrase still survives in the first paragraph of 19 U.S.C. § 1673a. See. Peter D.
Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against Unfair International Trade Practices, SE06 ALl-ABA 337, 347, footnote
35(1999)
^^ In Kern-Liebers USA, Inc. y. U.S.. CIT 1995, 881 F.Supp. 618, 19 C.I.T. 393, the court explained that
;
[Sjcope of less than fair value investigation and subsequent determination pursuant to the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, as amended, lies largely within the discretion of the International Trade
Administration (ITA), and agency generally exercises this broad discretion to define and clarify
scope of antidumping investigation in manner which reflects intent of the petition.
^^ 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a).
Normal value is firstly the price at which the foreign like product is first sold (or, in the absence of a
sale, offered for sale) for consumption in the exporting country in the usual commercial quantities and
in the ordinary course of trade and, to the extent practicable, at the same level of trade as the export
price or constructed export price. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)( l)(B)(i).
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which the foreign h'ke product is sold for consumption in a country other than the
exporting country or the United States, ' or the Department may construct the price to be
used as the normal value/" The Department may determine the normal value of the
merchandise exported from a nonmarket economy country on the basis of the best
information available from that nonmarket country or other appropriate countries/'
Pretended sales and sales intended to establish a fictitious market are not considered
for determining normal value. "" If sales of the foreign product have been made at a price
below production cost within an extended period of time'''^ in substantial quantities/^
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This is called "third country price", which is used for normal value if there are not enough sales in the
home market to provide a usefial comparison (i e , if the home market is not "viable"). Normally, the
Department considers a market viable if the foreign producer's sales in that market equal at least five
percent (by either quantity or value) of its sales to the United States. 19 C.F.R. § 351.404(b), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(a)(l)(C).
Constructed value must be used if no useful normal value can be calculated ~ for example, where too
few sales are above cost, or there is no viable market outside the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e);
19 C.F.R. §351.405.
This is often called '"surrogate values". See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 27, at 347.
Surrogate value is used only for cases involving imports from a non- market economy. This
methodology is a variant of the constructed value approach. The foreign producer reports the quantities
(not values) of the inputs used to produce the merchandise, and a hypothetical market-economy price is
built by using the values that these inputs would have in a market-economy country at a comparable
stage of economic development, based on publicly available information. Id 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); 19
C.F.R. §351.408.
Department ofCommerce may consider that a fictitious market is established, if,
(i) different movements is made in the prices at which different forms of the foreign like product are
sold in the exporting country after the issuance of an antidumping duty order, and
(ii) the movement in such prices appears to reduce the amount by which the normal value exceeds the
export price of the subject merchandise. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (a)(2)
"Cost of production" means the sum of the following amount. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (b)(3).
(a) the cost of materials and of fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in producing the
foreign like product, during a period which would ordinarily permit the production of that foreign
like product in the ordinary course of business;
(b) an amount for selling, general, and administrative expenses based on actual data pertaining to
production and sales of the foreign like product by the exporter in question; and
(c) the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other expenses incidental to
placing the foreign like product in condition packed ready for shipment.
"Extended period of time" means a period that is normally 1 year, but not less than 6 months. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b (b)(2)(B).
" Substantial quantities" is satisfied if either of the following is met. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (b)(2)(C).
(i) the volume of such sales represents 20 percent or more of the volume of sales under consideration
then such sales may be disregarded in the determination of normal value. When such
below cost sales are disregarded, normal value shall be fixed on the basis of the
remaining sales of the foreign like products in the ordinary course of trade/^ If there are
no sales made in the ordinary course of trade, the normal value shall be the constructed
value of the merchandise. The prices at which the foreign like product is sold by an
affiliated party^^ may also be used in determining normal value.^° In the calculation of
production cost, a transaction made directly or indirectly between affiliated persons*^'
may be disregarded in order to secure fairness in calculating the amount usually reflected
in sales of merchandise under consideration in the market.^^
for the determination of normal value, or
(ii)the weighted average per unit price of the sales under consideration for the determination of normal
value is less than the weighted average per unit cost of production for such sales.
^^ 19 use. § 1677b (b)(1).
''Id.
''Id.
''^
"Affiliated" or "affiliated persons" is any of the following. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (33).
(a) Members of a family, including brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood), spouse,
ancestors, and lineal descendants.
(b) Any officer or director of an organization and such organization.
(c) Partners.
(d) Employer and employee.
(e) Any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 percent or
more of the outstanding voting stock or shares of any organization and such organization.
(f) Two or more persons directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with,
any person.
(g) Any person who controls any other person and such other person.(For purposes of this paragraph, a
person shall be considered to control another person if the person is legally or operationally in a
position to exercise restraint or direction over the other person.)
^° 19 U.S.C, § 1677b(a)(5)
^' See, supra note 79 and 80.
It a transaction is disregarded for reasons of transaction between affiliated persons and no other
transactions are available for consideration, the determination of the amount is made on the basis of the
information available as to what the amount would have been if the transaction had occurred between
persons who are not affiliated. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f)(2)
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To ensure that a comparison is made fairly with the export price or constructed export
price, the Department of Commerce makes adjustments to the price used to calculate the
normal value, by adding or deducting various expenses incidental to the subject
merchandise. The Department may also make additional adjustments to account for
differences in the conditions under which sales are made in the United States and the
comparison market.
^^'^
The United States definition and calculation of normal value is found to be a faithful
implementation of the Antidumping Agreement.*^^ United States law has even more
detailed regulation on the decision of normal value than is required by the Agreement.
This detailed regulation would have been required for transparency and fairness in
evaluating various economic factors. Whether intended or not, all these technical
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19 use. § 1677b(a)(6)
The practice of making adjustments for "similar" merchandise (known as "difference-in -merchandise
adjustments," or "difmers") can introduce distortions, in part because price differences are generally
accounted for on the basis of cost rather than market value. Moreover, a sale of even a very small
quantity of identical merchandise may suffice to establish its normal value before a resort to "similar"
products is proper — yielding comparisons that can sometimes be even more distortive than those based
on prices for "similar" merchandise. See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 27, at 347
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(7). 19 C F.R. § 351.412.
The statute provides criteria the Department of Commerce should review in determining whether a
level-of-trade ("LOT") adjustment should be made, such as whether the fimctions performed by the
sellers at the same level of trade in the US and foreign markets are similar, and whether different
selling activities are actually performed at the allegedly different levels of trade. . See, Ehrenhaft, supra
note 27, at 348.
See, Article 2 of the Antidumping Agreement, stipulating
;
(1) National authority is allowed to disregard, for purposes of determining "normal value", sales below
the cost of production. (Art. 2, Para. 2.2.1)
(2) If the sales are made in substantial quantities and at prices which do not provide for cost recovery
within a reasonable time (Art. 2, Para. 2. 1
.)
(3) Costs should be calculated on the basis of exporter's and producer's records, provided that such
records are in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the exporting country and
reasonably reflect the costs associated with production and sale of the product concerned (Art 2,
Para. 2.1 1.)
(4) Antidumping Agreement requires national authorities to base profit and selling, general and
administrative expenses on actual producer's data. (art. 2, para. 2.2.2.)
(5) Comparisons of normal value and export price be made on a fair basis, at the same level of trade,
(art. 2, para. 2. 4 )
19 use. § 1677b(a) (6)(C) and (7) Further, the Antidumping Agreement does not have a definite
provision to determine normal value for merchandise from nonmarket countries.
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regulations have empowered the Department of Commerce with broad discretion in
determming and adjusting the normal value.
Past cases are not found to be arguing about the appropriateness in application of
detailed regulations with respect to determination of normal value. This seems to be
mostly because of the discretionary nature of the administrative determination. However,
the broad discretion exercised by the Department of Commerce in determining normal
value leaves room for questions to its appropriateness.
3. Export Price
Export price means the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold before the
date of importation by the producer or exporter of the subject merchandise outside of the
United States to an unaffiliated purchaser in the United States or to an unaffiliated
purchaser for exportation to the United States. If the export price is not applicable due
to an affiliation among producer, seller and exporter, the Commerce Department
constructs an export price^^ to be used for comparison with the normal value.^^
Export price and constructed export price must be adjusted for equitable comparison
^^ For example, it is hardly persuasive that the aggregate quantity of the merchandise sold in a third
country must be at least 5% of the aggregate quantity sold in the United States in order for the price to
be taken as the normal value, while 4.9% is not qualified for the same purpose.
19 U.S.C. § 1677a (a). The export price may be the sales price to a purchasing agent or trading company
in the exporting country for shipment to the importing country. More typically, it is the price to a buyer
in the importing country. Because of the requirement that the customer must be unaffiliated, the export
price may be based on the resale price of the exporter's sales subsidiary in the importing country (rather
than the exporter's price to its subsidiary). See, Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New
Millenium : The Ascendancy ofAntidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. Int'l L & Bus. 49, 80 (1997)
Constructed export price means the price at which the subject merchandise is first sold in the United
States before or after the date of importation by or for the account of the producer or exporter of such
merchandise or by a seller affiliated with the producer or exporter, to a purchaser not affiliated with the
producer or exporter. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (b).
^" 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
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with the normal value by increasing"" or reducing'"" the amount equal to the duties,
charges, tax or any expenses incidental to establishing export price.
4. Finding of Dumping and Calculation of Dumping Margin'^"*
Dumping occurs when a manufacturer charges a lower price in the United States
market than in the manufacturer's home market or a third market, for the same or similar
91
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Export price or the constructed export price shall be increased by the sum of the following amount. 19
U.S.C. § 1677a (c)(1).
(a) the cost of all containers and coverings and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to
placing the subject merchandise in condition packed ready for shipment to the United States,
(b) the amount of any import duties imposed by the country of exportation which have been rebated, or
which have not been collected, by reason of the exportation of the subject merchandise to the
United States, and
(c) the amount of any countervailing duty imposed on the subject merchandise under part 1 of this
subtitle to offset an export subsidy.
Export price or the constructed export price shall be reduced by the sum of the following amount 19
U.S.C § 1677a (c)(2).
(a) amount, if any, attributable to any additional costs, charges, or expenses, and United States import
duties, which are incidental to bringing the subject merchandise from the original place of shipment
in the exporting country to the place of delivery in the United States, and
(b) the amount of any export tax, duty, or other charge imposed by the exporting country on the
exportation of the subject merchandise to the United States, other than an export tax, duty, or other
charge.
Additional reduction must be made with the following amount. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (d).
(a) the amount of any of the following expenses generally incurred by or for the account of the
producer or exporter, or the affiliated seller in the United States, in selling the subject merchandise
(or subject merchandise to which value has been added)—
(1
)
commissions for selling the subject merchandise in the United States;
(2) expenses that result from, and bear a direct relationship to, the sale, such as credit expenses,
guarantees and warranties;
(3) any selling expenses that the seller pays on behalf of the purchaser; and
(4) any selling expenses not deducted under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(b) the cost of any further manufacture or assembly (including additional material and labor), except in
circumstances described in subsection (e) of this section; and
(c) the profit allocated to the expenses described in paragraphs (a) and (b).
19 U.S.C. § 1677a (c).
This analysis requires calculations that are complex and time-consuming in their effort to achieve utmost
exactitude. The foreign producer or exporter is required to submit information in machine-readable
form, and this information is processed by Commerce using a standard program written in the
programming language, with numerous adjustments to the program to tailor it to the circumstances of
the particular case. Errors frequently arise from a mismatch between the agency's stated intentions and
the actual programming code Accordingly, effective advocacy in antidumping cases often requires an
understanding of program code or intention of a programmer. See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 27, at 351.
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merchandise after accounting for differences in sales conditions and merchandise
characteristics.'^^
If, by comparing the normal value and the export price, dumping is found to have
occurred, the Commerce Department fixes the dumping margin by calculating the
average amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price of the product in the
United States.'^*^
The Commerce Department determines dumping margins on the basis of a
comparison of a weighted-average of normal values with a weighted-average of export
prices or constructed export prices. For situations where weighted-average basis is not
suitable, the calculation of dumping margins may be made on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. However, a comparison of average normal values to individual
export prices or constructed export prices is allowable in situations where an
average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction methodology cannot account for a
pattern of prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods ~
i.e., where targeted dumping may be occurring. "^^ The Commerce Department must
^^ 19 use. §1673.
''Id.
''^
19 U.S.C. §1673b(d), §1673d(c), §1677f- 1(d)(1)(A).
Such a situation could be, for example, where there are very few sales and the merchandise sold in each
market is identical or very similar or is custom-made. See, Ehrenhaft, supra note E/, at 350. See, also,
Michael Y Chung
,
U.S. Antidumping Laws : a Look at the New Legislation, 20 N C J Int'l L. & Com.
Reg. 495, 503(1995).
^' 19 use. §1673b(d), §1673d(c), §1677f-l(d)(l)(A)(ii), 19C.F.R. §351.414(d).
The Commerce may determine by comparing the weighted average of the normal values to the export
prices of individual transactions for comparable merchandise, if,
(i) there is a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among
purchasers, regions, or periods of time, and
(ii) the Department explains why such differences cannot be taken into account using an average-to-
average or transaction-to-transaction method. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f- 1(d)(1)(B).
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disregard any weighted average dumping margin as de minimis that is less than 2 percent
ad valorem.
'
United States regulations on the determination of dumping margin are found to be in
compliance with the Antidumping Agreement, especially in that the use of an
average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction comparison is clearly prescribed for
application to investigation processes. ^ It is noted that the Antidumping Agreement
does not make a definition of dumping margin, but simply explains how dumping margin
is established,'"^ whereas the United States law has a clear definition of its own.'""*
B. Determination of Injury
1. Material Injury
The International Trade Commission is authorized to make investigation, seeking to
determine whether the dumping caused, or threatens to cause material injury to a United
States industry. '"^^ To determine the existence of material injury, the Commission
'"' 19U.S.C. §1673b{b)(3)
'"^ 19U.S.C. § 1677f- 1 (d)(1). Antidumping Agreement, art. 2.4.2
However, considering that the average-to-average or transaction-to-transaction comparison is rather a
rule than exception for calculation of dumping margin in the investigation phase, it is not persuasive to
limit the comparison method only to the average-to-transaction comparison for the same purpose of
dumping margin calculation in the administrative review process, even though it does not violate the
Antidumping Agreement. 19 C.F.R. § 351.414, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f- 1(d)(2). Antidumping Agreement,
art. 2.4.2.
See, Antidumping Agreement, Art. 2, Para. 2. 4 2, explaining that dumping margins are established by
comparing either a weighted-average of normal values to a weighted average of export prices of
comparable merchandise; or comparing normal value and export price on a transaction-to-transaction
basis.
""* 19 U.S.C. § 1075(35). Glossary of Terms.
John Jackson expresses his doubt on the view that it is not the Commission's job to determine whether
unfair trade practices [such as dumping] have materially injured the domestic industry, but rather to
ascertain whether the imports [whether fair or unfair to be determined by the Commerce] caused
material injury. John Jackson, William Davey, Alan Sykes, Le^al Problems ofIiUenmtiotial Econumic
Relations, West Publishing, 3rd ed (1995), at 730. But, it is more rational for the Commission to have
such an approach for finding material injury.
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investigates the domestic industry for any harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial
or unimportant to the domestic industry.
'*"^'
In determining the existence of material
injury, the Commission must consider various factors like volume of imports, the
effect of imports on prices for domestic like products'"*^ and the impact of imports'"'^ on
domestic producers of like products.
Threat of injury is found when it is supported by evidence that further dumped
imports are ''clearly foreseen and imminenf '" and material injury would occur if an
antidumping duty order is not issued, and it must "not merely be based on conjecture or
supposition.""" In the absence of compelling evidence of threat, it is not reasonable to
conclude that domestic industry is threatened when a majority opposes or does not
support the finding of injury. "^ Current United States provisions retain more factors to be
'°^ 19 use §1677(7)(A).
It is noted that the Antidumping Agreement does not have a definition on "material" injury.
Antidumping Agreement, art. 3, note 9.
"'^
In evaluating the volume of imports of merchandise, the Commission must consider the significance of
the volume of imports, or any significant increase in that volume. 19 U S.C. §1677(7)(C)(i)
'"**
In evaluating the effect of imports of the merchandise on prices, the Commission must consider the
existence of any significant price underselling, significant price depression, or prevention of price
increases caused by the imports. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(ii).
'"' In examining the impact of import on affected domestic industry, the Commission must evaluate all
relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the industry. 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(iii). But
the investigating authority evaluates such numerous and various factors, like "potential" decline in
output, "factors affecting" domestic prices, "potential" negative effects on cash flow, "ability" to raise
capital, "potential" negative effects on the existing development, "efforts" to develop a derivative or
"more advanced" version of the domestic like product, etc., that it is almost out of expectation for the
exporters investigated to expect the government officials in charge to make a reasonable decision
respecting fairly and objectively all these factors of discretionary nature.
"" 19U.S.C.§1677(7).
Antidumping Agreement, art. 3. 7.
\n Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. U. 5.,CIT 1981, 515 F Supp. 780, 1 C.I.T 312, the court stated that
"there must be information showing that the threat is real and that the entry is imminent before a
determination may be made of a likelihood of injury in an antidumping case."
"^ Id. 19 use. §1677(7)(F)(ii).
"^ Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. U.S.,CIT, 818 F.Supp.348, 17 C.I.T.776 (1993).
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considered in the decision of threat of injury than are listed in the Antidumping
Agreements."^ Inclusion of these factors is not inconsistent with the Agreement since the
factors listed in Antidumping Agreement are nonexclusive."^
Antidumping duty may be imposed if the Commission determines that establishment
of a United States industry is materially retarded by foreign dumping."^' However,
different from the case of material injury or threat of material injury, any definite
provision regarding material retardation is not found in United States law. This lack of
concrete provision on material retardation is also the case with the Antidumpmg
1 1 7
Agreement. However, "material retardation" is understood conceptually to be more
nebulous than the threat standard, since it does not even require that a domestic industry
exist as a condition precedent to an affirmative injury finding.
Once the determination of injury is made by the Commission in antidumping
proceedings, the injury is considered to be ongoing as to the industry irrespective of
subsequent changes in the composition of that industry, and if final affirmative
determination as to the existence of dumping is made, the Commission may make final
determination as to whether there was injury by reason of the imports."*^
"'* These are such factors pertaining to export subsidies, product shifting, raw and processed agricultural
products, actual and potential negative effects on existing development and production efforts, and "any
other" demonstrable adverse trends. Compare 19 U.S.C. s 1677(7)(F) with Antidumping Agreement at
art 3, para. 3.7.
"^ Antidumping Agreement, art. 3.7 (i)-(iv).
""^ 19 U.S.C. §1673(2)(B).
" Antidumping Agreement art. 3.
"** Kemira Fibres Oy v.U.S.,Cir 1994, 861 F Supp. 144, 18 C.I.T. 831, reversed 61 F.3d 866, on remand
19C.I.T. 1339.
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2. Cumulation
In making its injury determmation, the Commission assesses cumulatively the
volume and effect of imports from all countries of like products subject to investigation if
such imports "compete with each other and with like products of the domestic industry in
the United States market.""'^ The Commission is required to cumulate imports from all
countries as to which petitions were filed, or investigations were self-initiated by
Commerce on the same day, thus defining clearly the countries potentially subject to
cumulative analysis at the time of filing. The purpose of cumulation of injury is to avoid
negative injury determination when unfairly traded imports from various sources together
injure industry. '"^^ The Commission is not required to evaluate the volume of imports in
terms of quantity when determining whether to cumulate imports.'""'
The Antidumping Agreement explicitly permits the national authority to
"cumulate" the effect of dumped imports from more than one country under
investigation.'"^^ It is, however, noted that the United States provision on cumulation is
more stringently applied than the Antidumping Agreement expects it to be, in that the
Commission must make cumulative assessment without giving consideration to the
"^ 19U.S.C.§1677(7)(G)(i).
'^" Husiden Corp. v. Advanced Display Mfrs. ofAmerica, C.A.Fed.\996, 85 F.3d 1561
'^' Torririgton Co. v. U.S., CIT 1992, 790 F.Supp. 1 161, 16 C.I.T. 220, affirmed 991 F.2d 809.
'^^ Antidumping Agreement, art. 3 3, prescribes that the administering authority "wav" make cumulative
assessment, and the cumulation is applicable only if.
(a) the dumping margin for each country is more than de minimis;
(b) the volume of imports from each country is not neghgible; and
(c) cumulative assessment is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported
products and between the imports and the domestic like product.
'^^ The cumulative assessment has been criticized as attributing to all suppliers, even "innocent" ones, the
bad act of a single significant "injurious" supplier. Some view the cumulative assessment as reflecting
the United States trade policy Edwin A. Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems ofAiislralia, Canada, the
EEC and the U.S.A. : have Antidumping Laws become A Problem in International Trade '^ in
Antidumping Law and Practice : A Comparative Study, 456-57 (J.Jackson & E. A. Vermulst, 1989), cited
in Corr ,supra note 88, at 85.
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moderated requirement allowed under Antidumping Agreement.'^'*
The Commission is not to cumulate imports from any country tor which the
Commerce Department has made a preliminary negative determination, "" from any
country as to which the injuty investigation has been tenninated,'*^^" from CBI
countries,'"'^ or from Israel. ''^'^ Cumulation for threat of material injury analysis is made
in the same way as precluded for material injury analysis.
'^'^
3. Negligible Imports
Imports from a country accounting for less than 3 percent of the volume of all such
merchandise imported into the United States in the most recent 12-month period is
deemed negligible for injury determination purposes.' " The negligibility decisions are to
I ^ I
be made with respect to imports coiTesponding to a domestic like product. This "like
product" requirement is significant where the Commission finds two or more "like
products". In that event, negligibility must be assessed on each like product, not on the
overall subject merchandise Thus, where the Commission finds two or more like
products, the likelihood of a negligibility determination may be reduced, increasing the
'^"^ 19 U S C.§1677(7)(G)(i) prescribes that the Commission ".sT/a//" cumulatively assess the volume of
import — from all countries
^'' 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(G)(ii)(I) This provision could be understood as a partial implementation of the
provisions of Article 3.3 of Antidumping Agreement proscribing cumulation when the dumping margin
is de minimis
'^'' 19 use §1677(7)(G)(ii)(II)
'" 19 use. §I677(7)(G)(ii)(III), 19 U.S.C. §2701 et seq
''"* 19 use §1677(7)(G)(ii)(IV). Imports from Israel which are subject to US anti-dumping laws receive
favorable treatment for cumulation purposes as a result of the US - Israel Free Irade Agreement, which
was implemented by the U.S. -Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub L.99-47, 1985
'^'' 19 use. §1577(7)(H).
'^" 19 use §l677(24)(A)(i)
'' Id
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likelihood of an overall affiimative determination.
If the sum of imports from all such countries is 7 percent or less, imports from those
countries must be deemed negligible. For analyzing a threat of material injury only, the
Commission is directed not to consider imports from a country negligible, if "there is a
potential" that imports from such country "will imminently account for more than 3
percent" of total imports, or that aggregated volumes from subject countries exceed 7
percent of total imports.
''''*
4. Causal Link between Dumping and Injury
Under the Agreement and United States law, a causal link must exist between
dumping sales and the injury they cause or threaten. '^^ The Commission must assess and
determine'^^' whether dumped imports are causing injury to the domestic industry. For
this purpose the Commission evaluates all relevant economic factors having a bearing on
the state of the industry concerned.'" The dumping sales, however, need not be the sole
or even the most important cause of such injury,'^^ as long as they are more than a de
'^^ See, Michael Y Chung
, U.S. Antidumping Laws : a Look at the New Legislation, 20 N C J Int'l L.&
Com.Reg 495, 508(1995).
'"
19 use. §1677(24)(A)(ii).
'^'*
19U.S.C. §1677(24)(A)(iv).
'^^
19 U.S.C. §1673(2)(B), Antidumping Agreement, art.3.5.
'^''
19 U.S.C. §1677(2), 19 U.S.C. §1677(7)(C)(i)(ii).
'^^ 19 use §1677(7)(C)(iii).
Antidumping Agreement, Art. 3.5 also requires the national authority to examine any known factors
other than the dumped imports which also may cause the injury, such as non-dumped import volumes
and contraction of demand
''^ Antidumping Agreement (art 3 5 ) and United States law (19 U.S.C. § 1673 ) do not specify how
important a cause dumping must be, whereas the 1967 Antidumping Code required dumping to be the
"principal" cause of material injury. J.Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 688, 718.
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minimus cause. '^^ If substantial evidence exists to support a finding of sufficient causal
connection between imports and injury, existence of other contributing causes is
immaterial. ''^^ In determining whether dumping price has caused material injury, the
position of any segment of industry is not necessarily something to be considered.'" A
finding that imports from each country have a separate causal link to the injury is not a
prerequisite for cumulation. " The injury causation standards under existing United
States law are found fully consistent with the causation standards under the Antidumping
Agreement.
5. Industry
As the antidumping law is concerned with injury to domestic industry, the industry is
the basic element for the injury to be found. An "industry" is composed of domestic
producers'^^ of a product which is like, or in the absence of like, most similar in
characteristics and uses with the article subject to an investigation.'^'^
In "like product" determinations, the criteria generally examined are ; characteristics
and uses of the products production techniques; and interchangeability.
''^^
'^''
In the Maine Potato Council V. f/w7<?6/5/ar^.v, 9 CI 7 293(1985), the court stated that if the
Commission concludes that LTFV import were anything but a de minimus cause of injury, it must
make an affirmative injury finding." /J at 300-01
.
"*" Atlantic Sugar. Ltd. v. U. S., CIT 1981, 519 F Supp 916, 2 C I.T 18.
'^' Alberta Pork Producers' Marketing Bd v. U.S., CII, 1988, 683 F Supp 1398, 12 C I.T 262.
"^ In Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 859 F 2d 915 (Fed Cir 1988), the court stated that "The ITC
cumulated sales from Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan without determining that the sales from a particular
country, considered alone, caused "material injury" " and "We [the court] find the ITC's interpretation
reasonable— " Id at 917
'^' 19 U.S.C § 1677(4)(A) "Industry" means the producers as a whole of a domestic like product, or those
producers whose collective output of a domestic like product constitutes a major proportion of the
total domestic production of the product.
'** 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10).
'^' Roquette Ireres v. United States, 583 F Supp. 599, 603-04 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1984)
See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 27, at 352
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The domestic industry may comprise many national, regional, and local companies, but
must consist of competing producers of the subject merchandise, not suppliers or
customers of competing producers, sellers of competing but different merchandise, or
domestic sellers of foreign merchandise (unless they also produce like products within
the United States).
'^^
If there is a concentration of dumped imports into an isolated market and if the
producers of almost all of the production within that market are being materially injured
or threatened by material injury, or the establishment of an industry is being materially
retarded by reason of the dumped imports, material injury (the threat thereof or material
retardation) may be found to exist for a particular regional market, even if the domestic
industry as a whole of the like product is not injured. '"^^ The concept of regional industry
is designed to relieve domestic industry of the burden of demonstrating injury resulting
from imports on nationwide basis, but it does not preclude the Commission from
evaluatmg status of statutory region by looking at submarkets within the region for
purposes of determining whether to impose antidumping duties.''*^
C. Review of Antidumping Duty
Under the prior GATT Antidumping Code,'^^ there was no mandatory duration or
limit to antidumping measures. To remedy this problem, the current Antidumpmg
Agreement provides that ; antidumping duty orders remain in force for the shortest period
''*^
See, Ehrenhaft, supra note 27, at 352.
'^^ 19 use. § I677(4)(C).
'"**
Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. U.S., CIT 1985, 615 F.Supp. 577, 9 C I.T 357.
'*'^ Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT
Doc. MTN/NTM/232.
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and to the narrowest extent necessary to cure the injury caused by dumping;'^"
antidumping duty is to be terminated in 5 years from its imposition unless its continuation
is proved to be necessary to prevent the continuation or recurrence of dumping and
injury;'^' even before the end of the 5 year term, antidumping duty must be reviewed at
the initiative of the levying country or at the request of the interested party.
'^'
1 . Periodic Review
The Commerce Department is required to review and determine the amount of any
antidumping duty at least once in the 12 months period from the date of the publication
of the antidumping duty order concerned, if there is a request to do so.'^^ The Commerce
Department may revoke, in whole or in part, antidumping duty order after review. '^^
Under the United States law, a new exporter or producer of merchandise subject to an
antidumping order may request for an administrative review, establishing that he did not
export such merchandise to the United States, and that he is not affiliated with any
exporter or producer who exported the merchandise to the United States during that
period.
'^^
This "new shipper" is entitled to the right of accelerated review'^*" in order to
receive an individual dumping margin, and pending the result of the review the new
shippers need only to post a bond rather than pay definite duties. 157
'"'"'
Antidumping Agreement, art. 1 1 . 1
.
'-'
IJ. art 11 3.
'"
A/, art. 11.2.
'"
19U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1).
'^^ 19U.S.C. § 1675(d)(1)
"^
This is called a "new shipper review".
'''' The United States law allows the new shippers to request a review twice annually. 19 U.S.C. §
1675(a)(2)(B)(ii). See, Antidumping Agreement, art 9 5.
'" 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii), Antidumping Agreement, art.9 5
The new shipper review procedure affords new suppliers time to prepare for , and obtain a more
29
2. Changed Circumstances Review
If there is a knowledge of changed circumstances concerning an antidumping duty or
if there is a request from an interested party on the basis of changed circumstances, the
Commerce Department or the Commission conducts a review of the antidumping duty
order concerned.
'^*^ When the Commerce Department or the Commission receives
information showing changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review, it must
conduct a review of the antidumping duty order '^'^ In conducting a changed
circumstances review, the Commission determines the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of material injury at the revocation of antidumping duty. " '' An antidumping
duty order is not subject to reviews based on changed circumstances within 24 months
after the notice of the duty order. '^'' This restriction based on an application period seems
purposed mainly to secure stability in application of antidumping duty order by
restricting arbitrary requests of review from interested parties unsatisfied with the
antidumping duty order.
If the changed circumstances review was initiated at the request of an interested party,
such party bears the burden of persuasion concerning whether there are changed
circumstances sufficient to warrant the revocation of the antidumping order concerned.
favorable antidumping decision
,
relative to the "old" exporters who may have been locked out of the
market due to high margins. See. Chung , stipra note 44, at 521
.
'-'*
19 use. § 1675(b){l).
'''
Id
""
19U.S.C. § 1677(bX2).
'^'
19 use. § 1677(b)(4).
""^ 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b)(3). United States provision on burden of proof is somewhat different from
Antidumping Agreement in that the Agreement does not require the petitioner to carry the burden of
persuasion under changed circum.stances Antidumping Agreem.ent art 1 i 2 merely requires an
interested party requesting a review to submit positive evidence substantiating the need for review
See, Michael Y Chung
,
U.S. Antidumping Laws : a Look at the New Legislation, 20 N C J Int'l L. &
Com Reg 495, 518(1995).
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3. Sunset Review
United States antidumping duty orders must be reviewed before the end of five
years of application unless the Commerce Department and the Commission determine
that dumping would be likely to continue or recur, and that injury would be likely to
continue or recur, in the event of revocation. ' In their analysis of the likely
continuation or recurrence of dumping or injury, the Commerce Department and the
Commission may exercise discretion in making determinations with respect to the
presumed situation were the antidumping duty revoked. This discretion is highly likely to
lead to a wide discrepancy in determining the possibility of continuation or recurrence of
dumping or injury. The Commission is generally required to presume that future sales
will be at less than fair value if the antidumping duty is removed in the absence of the
Commerce Department's review of the matter. '^'^ This discretion of the Commerce
Department or the Commission in determining the likely continuation or recurrence at the
revocation of antidumping order should be considerately exercised, particularly with
respect to the sunset reviews where the exporters had to endure the 5-year-standing
antidumping duty order. Also, a special rule'^^ was established for sunset reviews of
antidumping orders that were in effect when the WTO Agreement became effective in the
United States on January 1 , 1995.
'^^
'" 19U.S.C. §1675 (c)(1).
""^ See, i.e.. United States - AntiJiimping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors
(DRAMS) ofOne Megahite or Above from Korea, in infra note 257
"^^ American Permac, Inc. v. U.S, CIT 1986, 656 F Supp 1228, 10 C IT. 719, affirmed 831 F.2d 269,
certiorari dismissed 108 S Ct 1067, 485 US 901, 99 L.Ed.2d 229.
"^'' 19U.S.C. §1675 (c)(6).
""^ The Commerce published a proposed schedule for review of transition orders. Transition Orders:
Schedule and (Grouping ()f live-year Reviews, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,686 (1997). Under this schedule,
reviews for similar commodities will be initiated together regardless of the initial effective date of the
dumping order As a result, some sunset reviews are scheduled to begin earlier than they may have
otherwise, and some reviews have been postponed Id
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United States provisions on sunset review are found to be basically compliant with
Antidumping Agreement. However, it is observed that United States law simply requires
a sunset "review""'*^ not later than five years ft^om date of imposition, which is a slight
change from the requirements of the Antidumping Agreement which requires
"termination" of any antidumping duty ' unless the authorities determine that the
expiration of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping
and injury.
'^^ 19 use. §1675 (cXl).
""^ Antidumping Agreement, art 1 1 3
,
prescribes that "any definitive antidumping duty shall be
terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition unless — " (emphasis added)
SECTION IV
CRITIC ISM OF ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Rationale of Antidumping Law is Doubtful.
1. Price Discrimination is Not Condemnable
Price discrimination - selling at different prices in different markets - is not illegal in
itself both in domestic and international trade. '^" Price discrimination is a rational
economic behavior a sensible business management will make in consideration of the
specific condition - the structure and price elasticity - of each and different market.
Under this line of argument, there is no justification for condemning certain export prices
simply because they happen to be lower than prices in other markets.' ' Actually, price
discrimination will increase its output in order to supply the lower-priced market, thus
offsetting the undesirable supply-restricting behavior.
Dumping is concerned only when the export price is lower than the comparison
price. Indeed, price fluctuations occur naturally in both directions, making it inevitable to
set different prices between markets. In such instances, exporters are penalized when
export price is below home market price, but are not given credit when export price is
higher than the home market price. '''^ Comparatively, domestic price discrimination ~
170
171
See, Schoenbaum , supra note 2, at 2
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 98.
'^^ W.J.Davey, AnfiJiimping Laws : A Time for Restriction, cited in J.Jackson et al. Legal Problems of
International Fxonomic Relations, West Publishing, 3rd ed 1985, p673.
'"
"It is a common business practice to sell products at a loss For example, if a product is not selling ~
well, a business owner might sell below cost in order to recoup at least some of his investment in the
product Yet when a foreign firm sells below cost in the U.S. market, it is considered to be abnormal
and unfair " Bryan T Johnson, A (iiiide to Antidumping Laws: America's Unfair Trade Practice,
32
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differences in pricing between one country's domestic regional markets ~ normally is not
penalized. '^^ In the current trade environment, which is moving toward
internationalization of world economy, there is no economic reason for treating
"international" price discrimination differently from domestic price decision.
2. N4onopolistic predatory pricing is unrealistic.
The support of antidumping law' ^ rests upon the belief that it protects domestic
producers and labor from the negative impacts of unfair price competition. Supporters
fear that exporting producers' "^^^ and foreign governments'^^ engage in predatory pricing
behavior with the intent of eliminating domestic producers from competition with below
cost pricing of goods. This allows exporting producers to control the domestic market and
extract monopoly profits from sales without domestic competition. The results are
displaced workers and expensive adjustment costs to the industry. These problems may
be cured if the exporter is only temporarily dumping goods in the m.arket, thereby
requiring domestic producers to reenter the supply market after the exporters have been
driven from the market.'''^
Backgrounder (Heritage Found.) No. 906, July 21, 1992, at 13, cited in Corr, Id dX 98
'^"^
In the United States, there is the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act which prohibits domestic
price discrimination, but only if such pricing is anticompetitive and predatory. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1994). This law, in any event, is very rarely enforced, which is due to the difficuhy of proving
predatory intent or, perhaps more simply, to the infrequency of predatory actions. See, Corr, supra
note 88, at 98.
'^^ See, supra note 4
'^'' See, i.e., Steven F Benz, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying ofMarket Share, 42 Stan L R 695, 704-05
(1990), explaining how foreign producers use private financing through monopoly prices at home,
cross-subsidization with other profitable pursuits, and capital markets financing.
' For example, foreign governments financial subsidization on research and development lowers the
producer's cost by decreasing the amount of capital the producer has to expend on new product
development Id
'^^ See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 437.
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However, a serious question lies with the ability of the exporter to engage in
predatory pricing schemes with the intention of ehminating domestic producers from
competition and controlling the importing country's market. It is not so much likely
that an exporter who has successfully forced his domestic competitors out of business
I xn
will reap monopoly profits from its efforts. Raising prices to monopoly levels simply
encourages others to enter the market, thereby recreating a competitive market. In
addition, exporters dumping merchandise at a price lower than the cost must absorb their
losses over a very long period time. ^ If the barriers to reentry are sufficiently steep due
to the cost of capital or the lack of technical ability, antitrust legislation can be applied to
control the extent of the monopoly price imposed on consumers. ' Therefore, the need
I %X
for antidumping laws to protect domestic producers from predation is not clear.
'^^
In Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., A15 U.S. 574, 589 (1986), Justice Powell wrote
the majority opinion, noting that
;
- A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative Any agreement to price below the
competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them.
The forgone profits may be considered an investment in the future,
- The predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off.
- For this reason, [there is a consensus among commentators that] predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.
See, also, Corr, supra note 88, at 99, citing Congressional Budget Office, How the GATTAffects U.S.
Anfidutnping and Countervailing Duty Pohc\\ app A at 79 (Sept 1994), stating ,
"Nearly all economists would agree that [predatory pricing] is substantially less common than
price discrimination and selling below cost and that, correspondingly, most price discrimination
and selling below cost do not constitute predatory pricing."
'^^ See, W.J.Davey, Antidumping Laws : A Hmefor Restriction, cited in J.Jackson et al, supra note 105, at
675.
See also, Benz, supra note 22, at 707-08
'*' See, Matsushida,supra note 179, at 589.
**^ See, Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 2.
See, Schoenbaum, supra note SC/, at 2.
But see, Benz, .supra note 22, at 724-25, noting the argument that current United States antitrust laws
cannot address government subsidized dumping due to a foreign government's immunity from judicial
action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1602-161 1 (1982) and "act of
state" defense.
"*''
"The small possibility of predatory conduct does not justify antidumping laws, especially since the
antitrust laws can effectively penalize predarory behavior in the event that it occurs." W J.Davey,
Antidumping Laws : A Time for Restriction, cited in J.Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 675.
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Supporters of the antidumping law argue their concern about the predatory low price
offered by foreign exporters, while they do not mention the comparatively lenient
I XS
treatment to the predatory low price offered by competing domestic producers. The
threat of monopoly that concerns supporters of antidumping laws is simply
ungrounded.
186
B. Antidumping Law is a Costly Protectionist Measure
Under the antidumping laws, whether of the United States or of other jurisdictions,
operated under the auspice of the Antidumping Agreement, antidumping duty is levied if
foreign merchandise is imported at a dumping price causing material injury (or threat
thereof) to the domestic industry. Hence, standing for invoking antidumping laws is
1 X7
limited to the domestic industry alleging material injury from a dumped import. These
laws imply that antidumping law is purposed for the benefit of the domestic industr>', not
that of the consumers who may otherwise benefit from the lower price. Also, the public
interest is not considered. The supporters' argument for antidumping laws is hardly
^^^ For discussion on discriminatory pricing by domestic firms, see, J Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 682,
explaining that "United states antidumping laws are applied in a much more restrictive manner than the
Robinson-Patman Act." The ultimate purpose of Robinson-Patman Act is to protect competition, not
individual competitors, while the (United States) antidumping laws seem designed to protect domestic
competitors whatever the effect on overall domestic competition. Brooke Group Lid V. Brown ct
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.Ct.2578, 125 L.Ed.2d 168(1993) and /c/.
See also, supra note 1 74 and infra notes 289, 291, referring to Robinson-Patman Act.
"*^
It is interesting that, "while the fear of predatory pricing permeates the dumping laws and regulations,
there are no known cases in the last hundred years where a company has dumped its products on the
U.S. market, bankrupted American producers, and then driven up prices and squeezed consumers for a
long period of time " James Bovard, The Fair trade Fraud, 157 (1991), cited in McGee, supra note 18,
at 540.
"*^ 19U.S.C.§1671a(b)(l).
United States law differs from that of the European Union and Canada in that it does not expressly
allow for consideration of the public interest as part of an antidumping proceeding Hilary K .Josephs,
ITie Multinational Corporation, Integrated International Production, and the United States
Antidumping LaH\ 5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 51,70 (1997)
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sustainable from the viewpoint of the national economy as a whole, because whether
the benefit of the antidumping law to the domestic industry can offset the loss incurred to
the domestic consumers is doubtful. ' ^'^' The concern with dumping is therefore a concern
with the protection of domestic industry from international competition.''^' The
antidumping law cannot break free from the criticism that it is operated only for the
protection of the domestic industry.
189
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Economists generally agree that , except for predation, dumping is basically harmless for the importing
country, and consumers in the importing country benefit from the lower price of imported goods. See,
Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Lou; 29 GeoWash.J Int'l L.&Econ 1, 1 1(1995), citing
V.Deardorflf, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Lom' in the Multilateral Trading System, at 135.
See also, W J Davey, Antidumping Laws : A Time for Restriction, cited in J Jackson et al, supra note
105, at 676-77, saying that "Overall, the economy [of the importing country] is better otT [as a result of
dumped import] ", and that "economic analysis does not support the application of antidumping duties
to counteract price discrimination so as to protect the market into v^hich goods are dumped."
The United States International Trade Commission had considered what the economy wide welfare
effects would have been if all outstanding United States antidumping (and countervailing) duty orders
in 1991 had been removed. The request for the report on the cost of U.S. antidumping measures
originally was made by Bush Administration United States Trade Representative(USTR) Carta Hills in
1992. Before the study was commenced, however, amid severe political criticism, Clinton
Administration USTR Mickey Kantor broadened the parameters of the study in 1993 to include the
benefit of antidumping measures to the domestic industry. See, Kantor Approves Antidumping Study,
Facts on File, World News Digest, July 8, 1993, at 506 Fl, cited in Corr, supra note 88, at 102.
When the Report was completed in 1995, it created a firestorm within the International Trade
Commission which had difficulty even agreeing to release the Report, and was met by protest from
both domestic industry and free trade advocates. See, Corr, id.
For the discussion of the in-fighting at the ITC caused by the Report, see. Cracking dp, NAT'L J., Oct.
28, 1995, at 2636, and Nancy Dunne, U.S. Antidumping Study Raises Political Hackles: Report
questioning counterx'ailing duties becomes focus ofITC dissension, FIN POST, Aug 23, 1995, at 10.
Former International Trade Commissioner, Alfred Eckes, a proponent of import protections,
criticized the Report as being the resuh of "cooking the books at the ITC," while Carla Hills stated that
it was a narrow study that did not reflect the pervasive effects of antidumping measures. Dunne infra,
Alfred E. Eckes, ( \>oking the Books at the TTC, J. Com., July 14, 1 995, at 6A, cited in Corr, id.
The report. The Economic Effects ofAntidumping and
(
Countervailing Duty Orders and Suspension
Agreements, USITC Inv.No. 332-344 (June 1995), USITC Pub., revealed a conclusion as follows,
- These orders affected $9 billion out of $491 billion dollars, or approximately 1.8% of all U.S.
merchandise imports in 1991.
- These orders imposed a net welfare cost on the U.S. economy of $1.59 billion dollars, or 0.03% of
the U.S.Gross Domestic Product in 1991.
- The loss to consumers in the form of higher prices tar outweighed the benefit to petitioning industries
in the form of increased output and employment.
See, Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 Geo.Wash. J. Int'l L.&Econ. 1, 1 1-12 (1995),
See, Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 Geo.Wash.J. Int'l L.&Econ. 1, 12 (1995), citing
Kenneth Dam, The GATT, at 168(1970).
The usefulness of antidumping measures has often been discussed arousing severe controversies over
its arbitrary implementation for protectionist purpose The OECD Report, which took five years to
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C. Antidumping Law is Against the Market Economy
Another fundamental problem with the antidumping scheme is that it invites a
significant governmental intervention into market economy mechanism. The government
is authorized to make various kinds of decisions necessary for operating antidumping
laws; such decisions as on a "fair" value, "constructed" price, margin of dumping, as well
as a decision on the "possibility" of continuation or recurrence of dumping or injury upon
revocation of duty order. Setting aside the risk of inevitable fallacies of human nature,
one is sure to doubt whether the government's findings and the decisions based on them
could be more effective substitutes to those made by the invisible hand of the tree market,
if spared from governmental intervention.
Further, considering that many antidumping cases terminate through agreements
between the investigating authority (the Commerce Department in the case of the United
States) and exporters (or their governmental branch) to "voluntarily" regulate exporting
in quantity, price, or both to eliminate the dumping margin, '^'^ the antidumping laws are
in reality the application of state power on behalf of private interests which have failed to
complete and reflected the views of eminent economists, former government officials and scholars,
was released to OECD member countries in confidential draft form in late 1995. The EU and the
United States, both substantial users of antidumping measures, attacked the portions of the Report that
were critical of antidumping measures and demanded revisions. See, Guy de Jonquieres, Report Coimts
Cost of Antidumping, Fin Times (London), Sept. 21, 1995, at 5 (The US. and EU "have vigorously
attacked its findings in the OECD, and are intent on watering the report down before allowing it to be
published later this year"); Guy de Jonquieres, [IS and Elf Attack Anti-dumping Report, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 21, 1995, at 5, cited in Corr, supra note 88, at 102.
Before the Report was released in 1996, they reportedly were successful. See, Jonquieres, US and EU
Attack Anti-dumping Report, id note 281 (stating that "[t]he draft report, submitted to the OECD in
March, is understood already to have been amended under US and EU pressure ") See, Id.
"^
"Government officials exercise of discretion is difficult to review and this presents serious problem of
potential abuse , a problem which may be magnified since those seeking protection from the officials
are constituents of sorts of the officials, while those who will be adversely affected are foreigners."
J.Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 671
,
^'^^
19 use. § 1673c(b)(1994).
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compete in the market. ''^^ Such apphcation of state power is contrary to the basic
premises of a free market system, where private enterprises enjoy the full freedom of
doing business activities only at their own risk.
Besides, the government's antidumping policy has a chilling effect on the market.
Any exporter will rationally decide not to enter a foreign market when facing the risk of
getting hit with an antidumping action which will cost an insurmountable burden in
meeting with irrational requests from the investigating authority for various data and
information as well as their verification,''^^' and there is the burden of costly lawsuits
proceeding in the foreign jurisdiction for years to be concerned about. Also, any rational
importer or customer will not do business with the foreign exporter who is being, or sure
to be, hit with an antidumping action which could bring an unexpected liability to him.
A simple initiation of investigation, or even a filing of petifion, is threatening enough to
drive both the exporters and importers away from the market. With the active application
by the investigating authority, antidumping law is simply thwarting the free market.
D. Antidumping Law Is Expanding Around the World
A serious problem with antidumping law is its rapid expansion around the world.
Historically, the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia, have been the
primary users of antidumping law, accounting collectively for over two-thirds of the
antidumping cases initiated between 1987 and 1994 (before the new regime of the WTO
^^^ See, Hilary K Josephs, /'he Multinational Corporation, Integrated International Production, and the
United States Antidumping Lau\ 5 Tul J Int'l & Comp L 51,71 (1997)
196
See, infra notes 267 and 268.
''^ Importers could be liable for any antidumping duty levied retrospectively, or might be subjected to the
court as a witness for the relevant judicial proceedings
198
See, generally, McGee, supra note 18, at 535, 546.
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came to be). This relatively small, traditional user group of developed countries has
successfully employed antidumping measures to protect their own domestic industries for
many years."" Even developed countries like Japan, which traditionally were critical of
antidumping proceedings, began to utilize their antidumping laws before 1995.^^'
Developing countries have learned well from the example of developed countries and
have joined the traditional user group of antidumping laws.
In 1980, only 8 countries had antidumping laws. " In 1994, 25 countries had joined
the GATT Antidumping Code and implemented antidumpmg legislation.^*^^ By December
1996, that number rose five fold to 128 WTO member countries,^*^"* and the terms of
WTO Agreement require that all'^^^ must join the Antidumping Agreement and ensure
adoption of conforming legislation.^^^
''''' From 1987 to 1994, the United States (339), European Community (256), Australia (319) and Canada
(158) have initiated l,072cases of dumping investigation in total, occupying collectively 67 6% of
1,586 cases taken by the whole countries of the world. See. Table 1, at 43
^""^ The United States (204), European Community (123), Australia (117) and Canada (103) have taken
collectively 547 (78 0%) of 701 definitive antidumping measures taken during the same period as
above, proving they were more active in employing antidumping measures in comparison to the
antidumping investigation. See, Table 2, at 44.
[A]lthough still critical of widespread use of antidumping measures, Japan has begun to employ
antidumping measures to protect its own industries. In 1993, Japan for the first time decided to impose
antidumping duties against imports of Ferro-Silico-Manganese fi'om China. It later in the same year
brought the same case against Norway and South Africa In 1 994, Japan brought another antidumping
proceeding against cotton thread from Pakistan. These measures contrasted with Japan's actions in the
early 1980s, when it initiated antidumping investigations on both cotton thread (1982) and
Ferro-Silico-Manganese (1983), but later terminated both cases. Corr, supra note 88, at 57, note 25.
For details in Japan's antidumping law and its first case, See Norio Komuro, Japan's First
Anti-dumping Measures in the Ferro-Silico-Manganese Case, 27(3)Journal of World Trade 5 (June
1993).
See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 441, footnote 54.
^"^ See, Corr, supra note 88, at 57, citing Renato Ruggiero, The State of World Trade, Trade Policy and
the WTO, FOCUS, Dec. 1996, at 8
^"''
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 57, citing INFO.& MhDIA liELDIV. WTO Members, FOCUS, Jan. 1997, at
II.
^"^ As of July 1999, WTO counted 134 countries as its members. WTO Annual Report 1999.
As part of the "single undertaking" rule, each WTO Member must accede to all WTO Multilateral
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In 1990, developing countries accounted for 12% of antidumping cases initiated, but
their share kept growing rapidly, occupying 68% in 1996, and up to 72% in 1998." ' This
growth trend is seen not only in the number of antidumping actions, but also in the
number of countries initiating antidumping actions. As other alternatives for protection
are eliminated, the number of countries initiating antidumping actions each year has
escalated rapidly; from 7 countries in 1987, it grew nearly three times to 20 countries in
1996, and much more than three times, up to 26 countries in 1998.
The increase in the number of countries employing antidumping law might be
explained partly by the fact that many of the new users of antidumping laws have
recently undergone substantial trade liberalization.'^'^*' This tendency is well illustrated by
many of the Latin American countries who recently have undergone comprehensive trade
liberalization."'^ Mexico has been cited often as an illustration of this trend. Between
-> 1 1
1987 and 1990, Mexico initiated a total of 47 antidumping cases." Between 1991 and
1995, Mexico initiated significantly more than teice as many, 127." " South Africa serves
as another example. In 1994 and 1995, South Africa initiated 16 and 18 antidumping
Agreements in Annexes 1-3 of the WTO Agreement, including the Antidumping Agreement
See, ''Final Act Emhodying the Results of the Urnguay Round ofMidtilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr
15, 1994, at para 2, (requiring signatories to submit the WTO Agreement to their "competent
authorities" for approval), and the WTO Agreement, art XIV 1-2 and XVI 4 (requiring conformance
with, and acceptance and implementation of the Multilateral Agreements).
See also. Antidumping Agreement, art. 18.4, e.Kplicitiy requiring each Member to "take all necessary
steps ... to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the
Antidumping Agreement "
For details. See, Corr, supra note 88, at 75, note 130.
^"^
See, Table ],at43.
'''
Id
^"^
See, J.Miranda et al, supra note 8, at 56-60.
^'" Id
^"
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 57, citing GATT Annual Report 1994, at 28
^'^
&f. Table 1, at 43.
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investigations respectively. However, in 1996, it initiated 30, and more than twice as
many, 41 investigations in 1998."' Following its rapid increase in the number of
investigations. South Africa has taken 18 definitive antidumping measures in 1997, nine
times the number of measures taken in 1994."'^ Even China, a non-WTO member and the
most frequent victim of antidumping actions," ^ has begun to incorporate antidumping
laws.^'^
Developing countries have been filing antidumping actions against one another, and
against members of the traditional user group," '^ to the grave concern of developed
nations. ^''^ Having used the antidumping law for their own benefit for such a long time,
213
214
215
216
217
218
Id.
See, Table 2, at 44.
China was the target in 20% of all investigation cases in 1994. GATT Annual Report 1995 at p 32, cited
in Corr, supra note 88, at 57. The most frequently targeted countries for dumping investigation since
1995 are as follows. (Number in the parenthesis is that of investigations made to during the year.)
WTO Annual Report 1996-1999, Table IV.4 or IV5.
-1995 : EC (21), China (16), Korea (14), Indonesia (7), Japan (6), Thailand (6), United States (6),
Brazil (3), Chinese Taipei (3), India (3), Kazakhstan (3), Mexico (3).
-1996
: China (39), EC (35), United States (21), Brazil (10), India (10), Korea (8), Thailand (8),
Chinese Taipei (8), Indonesia (7), Japan (7), Russian Federation (6), South Africa (6),
Bulgaria (3), Malaysia (3), Mexico (3), Poland (3).
- 1997 : EC (59), China (31), Chinese Taipei (16), Korea (16), United States (15), Japan (12), Indonesia
(9), India (7), Russian Federation (6), Malaysia (5), Thailand (5), Brazil (5), Poland (4),
Singapore (4), South Africa (4), Ukraine (4), Canada (3).
-1998
: EC (42), China (25), Korea (20), India (12), Russia (11), United States (15), Chinese Taipei
(10), Japan (10), Ukraine (9), Mexico (7), Brazil (5), Indonesia (5), South Africa (5),
Kazakhstan (4), Malaysia (4), Romania (4), Hong Kong (3), Poland (3), Saudi Arabia (3),
Turkey (3).
See, Antidumping and Countervailing Regulations of the People's Republic of China, issued Mar. 28,
1997 by State Council Order No. 214 in People's Republic Daily (Overseas Edition), Mar. 29, 1997,
cited in Corr supra note 88, at 57. For more details on of China's regulations, See. China to Establish
Antidumping Rules to Protect State Industries, Daily Executive (BNA) No. 23, at A-2 (Feb 4, 1997),
China initiated its first antidumping case against newsprintfrom the United States, Korea and Canada
on December 12, 1997 Inside US Trade, Dec. 19, 1997, at 8, cited in Con Id.
In 1993-1994, the EU was the second most frequent target of antidumping investigations, accounting
for 11% of all investigations initiated, and the United States was the fifth one, accounting for 4.3%.
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 59, note 41, citing GATT Annual. Report 1994, at 28.
A report by the US General Accounting Office highlighted the grave concerns of developed countries
regarding the spread of antidumping measures: "[FJearing possible abuse of these laws, [countries with
established procedures] have expressed concern over their adoption and use by newly industrialized
countries such as Mexico, South Korea and Brazil." See, United States General Accounting Office,
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the traditional user group of developed countries might find themselves at odds with
complaining about the arbitrary use of this protectionist instrument by the newly emerged
user group of developing countries."'^ Indeed, the developing countries justification for
such laws is hard to rebut: they simply adopted the rule prescribed in the Antidumping
Agreement, which is basically copying what the developed countries have, more
specifically what the United States has, been doing since 1921.^^"
Another problem with the increase in the number of countries employing antidumping
law is that a number of countries have recently adopted antidumping regulatory regimes
without getting fully prepared for its operation. Dumping and injury investigation is of a
task with such a discretionary nature that the investigating authority must have a fully
trained personnel and be provided with objective data and information. It is doubtful
whether the newly emerged user group of antidumping law is competent for the fair and
reliable investigation of dumping and injury."" As countries are forced to decrease
tariffs and phase out other trade barriers to comply with WTO rules, the use of
antidumping measures will inevitably increase.^^^
Report To Congressional Requestors : Comparison of US and Foreign Antidumping Practices 10
(1990), cited in Corr, supra note 88, at 56.
^"'^
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 56.
^^^
"This makes it extremely difficult for United States exporters to combat The leading United States
exporters argue that antidumping laws end up 'shooting the winners,' by penalizing those companies
who are best equipped to compete abroad, and protecting inefficient companies who cannot." See,
Bailey, .vw/^ra note 57, at 441
^^' See generally, Bailey, supra note 57, at 441.
^^^ Rut See, J Miranda et al, supra note 8, at 64, saying that the "proliferation of antidumping is not
altogether negative, as it appears to have helped countries navigate from a controlled to liberalized
trading regime; the developing countries liberalizing most intensively , tend to be active users of
antidumping
'"
/ Table 1 /
Antidumping Investigations by Reporting Country
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Country * Year '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '9-f '95 '96 '97 '98 Total %
Argentina - - - - 1 14 27 17 - 23 15 8 105 4.4
Australia 22 16 21 47 68 71 59 15 4 17 42 13 395 16.6
Austria - - - - - 5 4 - - - - - 9 0.4
Brazil - 1 1 2 7 9 34 9 5 17 11 17 113 4.7
Canada 31 15 13 15 11 46 25 2 9 5 14 9 195 8.2
Chile - - - - - - 1 1 4 3 - 2 11 0.5
Colombia - - - - 2 3 6 3 4 I 1 6 26 1.1
Costa Rica - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 2 1
Czech Rep. - - - - - - - - - - - 2 2 0.1
Ecuador - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 0.0
Egypt - - - - - - - - - - 7 - 7 0.3
European Com. 28 27 18 48 29 42 21 43 33 23 41 21 374 15.7
Finland 5 5 2 - 1 - - - - - - - 13 0.5
Guatemala - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 0.0
India - - - - - 8 - 7 5 20 13 33 86 3.6
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - 8 4 8 20 0.8
Israel - - - - - - 1 1 4 6 3 7 22 0.9
Japan - - - - 3 - - 1 - - - - 4 0.2
Korea I - 1 5 - 5 5 4 4 13 15 3 56 2.3
Malaysia - - - - - - - - 3 2 8 1 14 0.6
Mexico 18 11 7 11 9 26 70 22 1 3 6 12 196 8.2
New Zealand - 9 I 1 9 14 - 6 11 4 5 1 61 2.6
Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - - - 2 2 0.1
Panama - - - - - - - - - - - 2 2 0.1
Peru - - - - - - - 3 2 5 2 4 16 0.7
Philippines - - - - - - 1 7 - - 2 3 13 0.5
Poland - - - - 24 - - - - - 1 - 25 1.0
Singapore - - - - - - - 2 - - - - 2 0.1
South Africa - - - - - - - 16 18 30 23 41 128 5.4
Sweden - - 8 2 1 - - - - - - - 11 0.5
Thailand
Trin & Tob
Turkey
United States
Venezuela
7 21
15 40 24 34 63 83 32 48 13 21 163-334
1
1
22
7
6
1
33
411
20
0.3
0.0
1.4
17.2
0.8
Total 120 124 96 165 228 326 299 228 123 206 240 228 2,383 1000
Source : WTO Annual Report for 1995-1998, and J Miranda et al, supra note JM/, at 7, quoting WTO
Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database for 1987-1994.
Note : "-" means no investigation was made for the respective year.
/ Table 2 /
Definitive Antidumping Measures by Reporting ('ountry
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Country * Year '87 '88
;
'89
^
'90
'9J •92 '93 '9-t 95 96 •97 '98 Total %
Argentina - - - - - - 3 ! 2 18 10 13 47 4.0
Australia 4 12 10 6 23 35 13 14 I - 1 15 134 11.5
Austria - - - - - - - 2 - - - - 2 0.2
Brazil - - 2 - 2 9 6 3 3 6 2 14 47 4.0
Canada 14 10 5 7 12 9 25 21 27 - 7 10 147 126
Chile - - - - - - - 1 2 - 2 2 7 0.6
Colombia - - - - - 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 9 0.8
Costa Rica - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Czech Rep. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ecuador - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Egypt - - - - - - - - - - 1 5 6 0.5
European Com. 10 11 10 15 19 18 20 20 19 26 23 21 212 18.2
Finland 3 3 - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 8 0.7
Guatemala - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 0.1
India - - - - - - - 5 7 - 6 - 18 1.5
Indonesia - - - - - - - - - - 4 2 6 0.5
Israel - - - - - - - - 1 - - 6 7 0.6
Japan - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 2 0.2
Korea - - 1 - 2 - 4 3 - 5 6 6 27 2.3
Malaysia - - - - - - - - - 2 2 4 8 07
Mexico 1 4 4 3 10 8 12 26 3 5 7 5 88 7.6
New Zealand - 4 4 - 5 11 - - 4 4 - 1 33 2.8
Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Panama - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Peru - - - - - - - - 2 1 3 - 6 0.5
Philippines - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 1
Poland - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 0.1
Singapore - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2 0.2
South Africa - - - - - - - - 2 8 18 12 40 3.4
Sweden - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 0.1
Thailand - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 1 3 0.3
Trin.& Tob. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Turkey - - - - - - - 2 11 - - - 13 1.1
United States 35 13 26 16 17 23 47 27 33 12 19 16 284 24.4
Venezuela - - - - - - - - 2 - 2 - 4 0.3
Total 67 57 62 48 90 117 132 128 123 88 116 121 1,164 100.0
Smirce : WTO Annual Report for 1995-1998, and J Miranda et al, supra note JM/, at 7, quoting WTO
Secretariat, Rules Division Antidumping Measures Database for 1987-1994.
Note : "-" means no definitive measure was made for the respective year.
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E. Criticism of Current Antidumping Law in the United States
Criticism against the current United States antidumping laws could be made from
many points of view, as the developed countries, including the United States, have been
rebuked for their arbitrary administration of antidumping law both in substantive and
procedural matters.^^^ Much of the criticism focus on the two subjective criteria for
dumping determination; sales at less than fair value, and injury determination, which
have large room for misapplication and abuse. The result of inappropriate application is
that foreign exporters are excluded from competing in the United States domestic market
with the like product manufactured in the United States or imported from other countries
at a price as high, or higher, than the fair value, eventually forcing United States
994.
consumers to pay more for both domestic and imported goods.
1. Less Than Fair Value Test is far from being a fair test.
The Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) analysis rests upon the presumption that exporter's
price in its home market is a normal and fair value and can be used as a benchmark price
for comparison with the presumably unfair"^^ export price, which often is hardly true in
reality. An exporter with stronger consumer demand in its home market is able to charge
higher prices. This is usually the result of a less competitive home market with high tariff
barriers or other nontariff barriers (or both), which effectively shelter producers from
foreign competition. More than often, the home market price is based on the monopoly
power of the exporter.""" Yet this ability to charge higher prices at home will result in a
^^'
Cf, Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 2.
^^^
See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 437
^^^ There is a suspicion that [dumping] practices are unfair only in the eyes of the import-competing
countries that would like freedom from the competition brought by import See. J Jackson et al, supra
note 105, at 2.
^^^' See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 438.
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bigger difference between home prices and United States prices which is grounds for a
determination of dumping." For this reason, exporters home market price cannot be a
fair standard to rely on for assessing a dumping margin.
Also, the LTFV analysis fails to distinguish between dumping with the predatory
intent of inflicting serious injury on the importing country's domestic producers, and
dumping motivated by economically rational grounds."" The LTFV analysis simply
ignores the economically rational pricing by exporters who might be seeking to recover
for fixed costs to help minimize their loss.""^
Furthermore, the use of surrogate countries to assess "fair value" is a dubious
process, because countries at similar levels of economic development have different pnce
and comparative advantages." The arbitrary use of surrogate countries or individual
surrogate costs have brought irrational outcome in many cases.
^^' See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 438, citing John J Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade— The
United States and the International Antidumpmg Code, 57 Cornell L.Rev. 491, 503- 04 (1972).
^^^ These include the following; 1 ) charging low prices to enter a new market, to create demand for a new
product, to retain customers in an established market, or to test market alternatives in experimental ploy
and 2) dumping in the short run in order to continue to operate at full capacity in the face of a cyclical
downturn in demand in the home market Id. citing Barcello at 510
^^^ Economic and business theory suggest that producers who have sunk in fixed costs to build up plant and
equipment should be encouraged to continue producing as long as the average price of goods sold
exceeds the average variable cost of producing these goods. Id This means that the excess above
variable costs can be used to cover at least some of the sunken fixed costs without incurring additional
unrecoverable variable costs of production. To force a producer to refrain fi"om such sales would mean
turning away sales that would have helped cover fixed costs Id. citing Barcello at 510
^^^ [I] can tell horror stories about how one goes about choosing a surrogate; it is usually done about 10 at
night when one has run out of any reasonable alternative. Just to take an example, for Chinese shop
towels we went through in order: Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Dominican Republic,
Colombia, and wound up with a hypothetical Chinese factory in India. It just doesn't make any sense.
Gary Horlick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration from 1981 to 1983,
describing to the Senate Finance Committee the process of choosing a surrogate country, as cited in
McGee, supra note 18, at 515
See, also, Larry B.Loftis, United States European Economic Community Antidumping Laws: The
Need for a Comprehensive Approach, 15 Ga J IntT&Comp Law 453, 469(1985).
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This problem was typically shown with the nonmarket economies, as the following cases illustrate.
( 1 ) Uraniumfrom the U.S.S.K.
Department of Commerce Notice.A-834-830 to A-843-802, 3 June 1992, 57 FR 23380
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2. Injury Test is an instrument for supporting unprofitable marginal enterprises.
Finding of material injury or a threat of material injury is required for a decision of
dumping. The Commission considers the exports impact on domestic industry in terms of
various economic indicators, such as prices, market share decline, customer loss, idle
capacity, and probability of future injury. " The investigation is mainly focused on
finding any loss or threat of loss experienced by domestic producers of a like product.
Under such a standard, injury is found with much ease, because there are always
incompetitive marginal domestic producers who cannot help experiencing negative effect
from import of competing same or like products irrespective of whether they are dumped
or not. In practice, the antidumping suits are invariably tiled by some United States
In calculating the fair value of the uranium imported from 6 republics of the former Soviet Union -
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the Commerce Department took
some unsubstantiated numbers offered by the petitioners as well as taking surrogate country of ;
Portuguese for electricity, Namibian for labor costs, and Canada for work performance efficiency In
arriving at its calculation, the Commerce Department assumed that, since Canadian uranium miners are
four times as efficient as Czech miners, and since Czechoslovakia is also a nonmarket economy, then
CIS miners must be only twenty-five percent as efficient as Canadian miners. Thus, they require four
times as much labor, so the Commerce Department computed CIS labor costs accordingly By doing so,
the Commerce Department arrived at the preliminary dumping margin of 1 15 82%. See, McGee, supra
note 18, at 498, citing James Bovard, U.S. Protectionists Claim a Russian Victim, Wall St J June
8,1992, at A- 10.
The former si.x republics later agreed individually to restrict the volume of direct and indirect export of
uranium to the United States The investigation suspended. Department of Commerce Notice. A-IOO-
200, 30 October 1992, 57 FR 49220
(2) (jolfC ^art from Poland
In 1975, the Commerce Department took a Canadian golf carts manufacturer for the purpose of
calculating fair
value of the golf carts imported from Poland, because there was no golf courses in Poland and the carts
were sold only in the United States. During the investigation, as the Canadian manufacturer went out of
business the next year, and no other company made golf carts usable for comparison purposes, the
Department chose Spain as a country at the same level of economic development. It was then
determined, using these new cost calculations, that the Polish carts were not being dumped, with the
result that the earlier antidumping finding was revoked in 1980. See, McGee, supra note 18, at 513-14.
For discussions about the nonmarket economy status under the United States antidumping law, see;
Joseph A Larosky, NMKS: A Lovestory Nonmarket and Market Economy Status Under U.S.
Antidumping LaH\ 30 Law&Pol'y Int'l Bus 369(1999) and,
Luke P Bellocchi, The Effects ofand Trends in Executive Policy and Court of International Trade(CIT)
Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Nonmarket EconomyfNMEj of the Peoples Republic of
China. 10 N.Y Int'l L Rev 177(1997)
"^ 19 use. §1677(7)(C)(i)-(iii).
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company or companies that want to use government as an instrument to keep competitors
from chipping away at their market share.^^^ The current low standard of material injury
should be raised, and be turned for application to the competition, not to competitors.^^'*
3. Calculation of Dumping Margin is Arbitrary
a. Adjustment of Data
The Commerce Department determines whether dumping is occurring by comparing
the export price of subject merchandise with the "normal value" of the merchandise. "^^^ In
order to achieve equity, a comparison is made on the basis of ex-factory price for sales of
the same or similar product to the first unrelated customers in the export market, and in
the comparison market during the investigation period." This requires the Commerce
Department to adjust prices by deducting a variety of costs, such as transportation
expenses, selling expenses and, if necessary, differences in physical characteristics
between products and trade levels.
For this intricate comparison purpose, the Commerce Department requires the
responding foreign exporters, suppliers and manufacturers to provide vast quantities of
data in observance of the predetermined time schedule. The Commerce Department
^'' See, Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 New J Int'l L.&Bus. 491,
542(1993)
^^'* There is an argument for an even stricter requirement for the decision of dumping that an actual or
implied "predatory intent" to injure domestic competition be proven to establish material injury to
domestic industry. See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 440.
^'^ Normal value is the exporter's home market price, third country price or a constructed price 19 U.S.C.
§1677a(a). Antidumping Agreement, art. 2. 2.
"'' Antidumping Agreement art. 2.4.
"^ /J. arts. 2 3, 2.4.
'''
Id.
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normally requires the actual product-specific records of the responding firm, and will not
accept estimates, accruals or budgeted amounts. ""^^ Many inexperienced respondents find
these procedures enforced by foreign law incomprehensible. As many foreign
manufacturers use an accounting system having technical variance from the accounting
system of the investigatmg country and maintain different business practices," this
requirement often means that a company must make a painstaking recalculation of
product costs for antidumping purposes. Moreover, the Commerce Department has
substantial discretion to "adjust" the data exporters have reported, particularly where the
exporter was forced to depart from its usual accounting system to derive cost data on the
basis of the required accountmg system. These adjustments can have a significant effect
on the antidumping margin calculated." One would not expect that carrying out all these
intricate and discretionary procedures would produce an objective result in the calculated
dumping margin.
Also, many of the computations the Commerce Department uses violate generally
accepted accounting principles, the principles most United States companies use in their
published financial statements. But the government does not have to follow generally
accepted accounting principles, since these rules are promulgated by private groups, such
as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board. Some of the computations the Commerce Department uses to arrive at
^^^
Id. art 2.2. 1. 1 . This provision was added by countries critical of the prior U.S. system which imposed a
mandatory minimum amount for general and administrative expenses (ten percent) and profit (eight
percent) even if actual amounts were lower. Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New
Millenium : the Ascendancy ofAntidumping Measures, 18 Nw J.Int'l L &Bus 49, 81 (1997)
^''^ For example, it is a common practice in certain countries for companies to give discount for large
purchases. Also, "(gratuity) rebate" which refers to a business practice of returning unofficially to the
buyer a certain portion of the amount contracted is still in existence in certain countries, though
gradually disappearing with the growing need of transparency in line with the internationalization of
domestic business.
^'*'
See, Corr, supra note 88, at 82.
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a dumping decision violate common sense as well.'^ " Another problem with the
Commerce Departments methodology is that it sometimes compares products that are
not all that similar,' or sometimes disregards the differential quality of products"^^ when
it computes its dumping margin.
b. Facts Available (or Best Information Available)
Where a respondent does not or is not able to provide information, or if the
respondent's data is missing or submitted in improper form, the Commerce Department
may resort to facts otherwise available to it in the place of actual data.'"*^ Further, the
Commerce Department may resort to an " mference adverse to the mterest of the
respondent'" if it finds that the responding party subject to investigation does not act ''to
the best of its ability" to comply with its request."'*^ Hence, the "facts available" are very
243
^ For example, the Commerce included into Suzuki's cost of production the expense for defending itself
against charges by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission that it made unsafe all-terrain
vehicles. Likewise, the Commerce included in production costs the donations that two Korean sweater
manufacturers made to local charities, claiming that it was part of the cost of making sweaters. USITC
Pub. 2577, Inv. No. 731-TA-448-450 (Sept. 1990;, Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight ofManmaJe
fibers from Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. "Any CPA who made such classifications could be sued
for malpractice." See. McGee, supra note 18, at 507, citing Bovard, at 129.
See. Luciano Pisont Fahbrica Accessor/ Instrumenli Musicali v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 255 (CIT
1986), afFd, 645 F. Supp. 956 (CIT 1986).
[A]n Italian company was found guilty of selling woodwind musical instalment pads for 1 16% less
than fair value. The Commerce Department computed the dumping margin by comparing the cost of
smaller pads sold in the United States with larger pads sold in Italy. Naturally, the larger pads would
cost more than the smaller pads, all other things being equal But that did not make any difference to the
Commerce Department. It treated the smaller pads and the larger pads as identical for computation
purposes It explained away its position by stating that the Commerce Department has unlimited
discretion to make or not make adjustments for differences in merchandise Bovard. at 119, cited in
McGee, supra note 18, at 512.
[T]he Commerce has compared grade B Canadian raspberries sold in the United States to make juice to
grade A raspberries that are sold in Canada to make jam The grade B raspberries were harvested by
machine, whereas the grade A raspberries were harvested by hand. The cost of hand-harvesting is twice
the cost of machine harvesting, yet the Commerce Department denied any adjustment for the difference
in harvesting cost, and assessed a dumping duty because of a 002% price differential, which amounts
to less than one cent per 500 pounds of raspberries Bovard, at I 19-21, cited in McGee, supra note 18,
at 5 12
245
246
19 use. § 1677e(a).
19 use. § 1677e(b).
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likely to be based on the biased allegations expressed in the petition or an ungrounded
inference. This risk of producing an irrational result is even more conspicuous where
normal value is constructed using the "best information available" to the Commerce
Department. "^^ The Commerce Department even finds a surrogate country, or surrogate
cost of production of various parts from various surrogate countries, for the purpose of
calculating the export price of the non-market economy or economies in transition. '^'^^
Indeed, the ''best information available" or "facts available" rule has been used as a
statutory ground for an irrationally high margin of dumping,^"^^ to be a source of grave
247
248
249
See, i.e.. Uraniumfrom the U.S.S.R.. Department ofCommerce Notice. A-834-830 to A-843-802, 3 June
1992, 57 FR 23380, cited in Corr, supra note 88, at 84
[T]he Commerce Department initiated in 1992 an investigation on uranium imports from six republics
of the former Soviet Union - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan -
sending the six governments a sixty-six page questionnaire - in English, of course - that demanded
detailed information regarding their uranium operations. It violated U.S. law by failing to provide them
with copies of the full petitions that were filed by the domestic producers and a labor union that initiated
the proceedings. The six CIS countries were found guihy of dumping because they failed to provide the
thousands of pages of documentation demanded. The information could have been obtained,
theoretically, from the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry. However, that ministry was
abolished a few months previously, and much of the information would have been top secret anyway.
The Commerce Department took some unsubstantiated numbers offered by the petitioners, and
determined what their costs would have been if they had used Portuguese electricity, Namibian labor
costs, and performed the work with Canadian efficiency In arriving at its calculation, the Commerce
Department assumed that, since Canadian uranium miners are four times as efficient as Czech miners,
and since Czechoslovakia is also a nonmarket economy, then CIS miners must be only twenty-five
percent as efficient as Canadian miners Thus, they require four times as much labor, so the Commerce
Department computed CIS labor costs accordingly By doing so, the Commerce Department arrived at
the preliminary dumping margin of 115 82% J.Bovard, U.S. Protectionists Claim a Russian Victim,
Wall St.J June 8,1992, at A- 10, cited in McGee, supra note 18, at 498
The six republics of former Soviet Union later agreed individually to restrict the volume of direct
and indirect export of uranium to the United States The investigation suspended Department of
Commerce Notice. A- 100-200, 30 October 1992, 57 FR 49220.
See, supra note 23
1
For more discussions on this problem, see Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency : Treatment of
NonMarket Economies in Transition under United States Antidumping and (\>untervai/ing Duty Taws,
10 Am U J Int'l L & Pol'y 993 (1995), and Luke P Bellocci, /he Effects q/ and /rends m Executive
Po/icy and Court of/nternational Trade (CTT) /decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-!vlar/<et
Economy (NME) of the Peop/es Repu/y/ic ofChina, 10 N.Y.lnf 1 L.Rev. 1 77 (1997).
The effect of the application of "facts available" rule by the Commerce was clearly manifested in the
following cases
( I ) Photo A /humsfrom Korea
On 19 February 1985, the Commerce initiated an antidumping duty investigation on photo albums and
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threat to the small and medium sized suppliers who are so petty as to keep books on
mternationally acceptable accountmg standards/^" As a consequence of all these
photo album filler pages ("photo album") from Korea on the basis of the petition filed by 4 United Sates
manufacturers of photo album. The Commerce presented questionnaires in March and May 1985 to
Korean manufacturers of photo album who had to hurry to meet the deadline of 25 June 1985.
In July 1985, the Commerce made a notice of preliminary determination of dumping margin of 4.04%,
requesting for more detailed data and information for tlnal determination of dumping margin due in 2
months, which later was postponed until October 1985 at the request of the Korean respondents
experiencing severe difficulty in meeting the Commerce Department's request for technically
complicated data.
In October 1985, the Commerce announced the final determination of dumping margin of 64 81% in its
Notice A-580-501, 50 FR 43754, stating that
;
" because of the numerous discrepancies found in the amounts presented in the reports on sales to the
United States and the failure of the [Korean] respondents to provide sales information in an acceptable
form— , we [the Commerce] calculated the purchase price of photo albums — on the basis of the
prices of offers of this merchandise proviJed by petitioners^ and "[I]t was determined that these
responses [from Korean respondents for determining foreign market value] were not sutTiciently
supported by cooperate cost accountiitg records and did not properly represent the costs— " , fijrther
that , "//// is the obligation ofrespondents to provide an accurate and complete response prior to
verification — ", and "///// accordance with the best available information requirements— , we [the
Commerce] calculated the constructed value on the basis of the cost data submitted by the petitioners —
" (emphasis added).
On 16 December 1985, the Commerce issued the antidumping order with the dumping margin of
64 81% which lasted for 12 years until revoked on 21 March 1997. Department of Commerce Notice.A-
580-501, 16 December 1985, 62 FR 13596
(2) Ball Bearingsfrom Sweden
In an investigation in 1989on antifriction ball bearings imported from Sweden, the Commerce
Department placed a particularly onerous and burdensome reporting requirement on SKF, a Swedish
bearings manufacturer. The Commerce demanded, and SKF supplied, information on more than 100
million separate sales. The first submission weighed three tons, was more than 150,000 pages in length,
and included more than 4 billion pieces of information As might be expected, there were a few
mistakes in the data, which the company put together in about a week, the amount of time the
Commerce Department gave it to respond About one percent of the data from its German sales were in
a form that was not suitable to the Commerce Department, so it ignored all the data the company
supplied and worked up its own numbers, using the best information available. The result was a
dumping margin of 180% which was later used as the amount of antidumping duty
.S'ff, Department of Commerce Notice. A-40 1-801, May 15,1989, 54 FR 20907
See also, McGee, supra note 18, at 499-500, citing Bovard id.
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In the case oi Photo Albums from Korea, supra note 249, when the petition was filed, there were a total
of 62 active manufacturers in Korea, of which 34 were engaged in export employing 2,400 workers In
1984, the previous year to the petition, 1 5 manufacturers recorded export amounting less than 1 million
U.S. dollars, 17 manufacturers recorded between 1 and 5 million dollars of export, 2 manufacturers
recorded more than 5 million dollars About 60% of the export was made to the United States These
exporting manufacturers were not competent to bear the expenses for legal and accounting service and
travel for attending the public hearing that are requisite for coping with the proceedings in the
Commerce and the Commission. This exceptionally high dumping margin proscribed Korean export of
photo album to the United States, driving most photo album manufacturers eventually to bankruptcy A
nationwide campaign arose to buy photo albums for Christmas presents which fell to an on-street-sale-
item at a "far-below-cost" clearance price in domestic market. N.H Hahn et al. Trade Conflict Cases of
Korea, POSCO Management Institute, May 1999, p 482 et al (original in Korean)
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arbitrary and discriminatory treatments, it has become out of the question to find
dumping and injury in almost all the cases investigated."^ The statute provides that the
Commerce Department may not decline to consider information that is timely, verifiable,
reasonably complete, and submitted in good faith. "^~ Nevertheless, one can hardly expect
that the investigating authority carry out economic value analysis in a fair and rational
way for dumping margin calculation purpose with the consideration of peculiarity in
individual cases.'^^
4. There is no objective criterion for operation of review mechanism.
Antidumpmg duty is required to remain in force for the shortest period necessary to
counteract dumping."' For this purpose, antidumping duty is
; (1) subject to review for
the necessity of its continuation , and (2) to be terminated in 5 years from its initial
imposition unless its continuation is proved by review to be necessary to prevent the
continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. "^^ In deciding the extension of the
antidumping duty, the administering authority has the power to find the possibility of
^^* [I]n the United States, the Commerce Department found dumping in 96 1% of the cases investigated
from January 1, 1980 to July 31,1997. The International Trade Commission (ITC) makes affirmative
findings in over 60% of the cases brought before it, a less certain but still troubling scenario for
exporters and importers faced with an antidumping action See, Corr, supra note 88, at 54.
^^^ 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e).
^^' See, Schoenbaum, supra note 2. "[I]t must be admitted that in all but the most egregious case, the
comparisons necessary in LTFV investigations are inherently arbitrary and unfair "
,
and "The United
States law and regulations are a misleading attempt to do the impossible - inject precision into an area
that is inherently imprecise" JJ at p 12 and 13
See also, J.Jackson, supra note 105. "[W]hen the cost of production is calculated in an arbitrary manner
... antidumping rules can easily be abused for protectionist purposes and — by inflating the normal value
-- lead to establishment of dumping margins where none (should) exist." IJai 445-46
See, also, Leslie Alan Glick, The US Antidumping Statute Proposed Revision and Areas of Reform,
35 Fed B News&J.72 (1988), discussing the need to restrict and clarify use of 'Best Information
Available' IJaX 72.
^''* Antidumping Agreement, art 111.
^^- Id art. 11.2, 11.3.
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continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury in the absence of the antidumping duty.
This decision of the administering authority on the future possibihty is highly
discretionary in nature, as it is unrealistic to establish fair and objective criteria for
decisions to be made under hypothetical conditions.
United States antidumping law prescribes that antidumping duty may be revoked if
there was no dumping for at least 3 years in a row, and it is "not likely"' that the dumping
will not be committed in the future.'^^ Of these conditions, the "not likely" condition does
not have detailed criteria for an objective decision, and the decision is totally left to the
discretion of the Commerce Department. The United States has been taking advantage of
this discretionary benefit even at the trouble of having to wage a dispute settlement
procedure under WTO over its decision to maintain the antidumping duty where its
continuation has hardly proved necessary. ^^^
^^^ Section 353.25(a)(2) of Regulations, Department of Commerce, read as follows (until 2 September
1999)
;
The Secretary [of Commerce] may revoke an order in part if the Secretary concludes that :
(i) One or more producers or resellers covered by the [antidumping] order have sold the merchandise at
not less than at foreign market value for a period of at least three consecutive years
,
(ii)It is not likely that those persons will in the fijture sell the merchandise at less than foreign market
value ; and
(iii) (omitted).
This section was very recently changed, but disputed in WTO/DSB See, infra note 257.
A dispute of this nature is the I hiiled Slates - Antidumping Duly on Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors (DRAMS) ofOne Megahile or Abovefrom Korea WT/DS99/K Jan 29, 1999.
The chronological development of the case is as follows :
— On 22 April 1992, Micron Technologies, Inc filed an antidumping duty petition with the United
States International Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce ("DOC" in this footnote)
against imports of DRAMs from Korea.
— On 10 May 1993, DOC issued an Antidumping Duty Order and Amended Final Determination for
DRAMs fi'om Korea The Notice found dumping margins of 82% for Samsung Electronics
Co.,Ltd.("Samsung"), 4 97% for LG Semicon Co.,Ltd.C'LG Semicon"), 1 1 16% for Hyundai
Electronics Co ,Ltd ("Hyundai) and 3 85% for all others The Parties appealed the DOC's Final
Determination to the United States Court of International Trade, which remanded the case to the
DOC to correct certain errors
— On 24 August 1995, in its Redetermination on Remand, the DOC found the corrected dumping
margin of 22% for Samsung (de minimis), 4 28% for LG Semicon, 5 15% for Hyundai and 4 55%
for all others.
— The DOC initiated the first annual review of DRAMs from Korea on 1 5 June 1994, and in its Final
Result on of 6 May 1996, the DOC found that LG Semicon and Hyundai had not dumped during
the period of review
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The DOC initiated the second annual review 12 months later on 15 June 1995, and in its Final
Result on of 7 January 1997, the DOC found that LG Semicon and Hyundai had not dumped also
during the period of review
On 8 May 1996, the DOC published a Notice of Opportunity to Request Administrative Review.
Pursuant to this Notice, LG Semicon and Hyundai filed a request for an administrative review on
29 and 3 1 May 1996 respectively, and asked to revoke the antidumping duty order
On 25 June 1996, the DOC initiated the third annual review. At the same time, the DOC initiated a
revocation review pursuant to the above request made under 353.25(a)(2) of the DOC Regulations.
On 24 July 1997, the DOC issued its Final Result and Determination Not To Revoke Order In Part,
while Hyundai and LG Semicon was found again not to have dumped during the period of review,
(i.e. "no dumping for three consecutive years").
On 14 August 1997, Korea requested consultations with the United States regarding the latter'
s
antidumping duty on DRAMs from Korea, pursuant to art.4 of the Understanding on rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute (DSU).
On 9 October 1997, consultation was held between Korea and the United States, but no satisfactory
mutual solution was reached
On 6 November 1997, Korea requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to art.6 of DSU,
Article XXII: 1 of the GATT 1994 and art 17 5 of the Antidumping Agreement
A panel was composed on 19 march 1998, and the panel meeting with the both parties were held on
18 June and 21 July 1998 The main argument of Korea and the United States before the panel was
focused on whether section 353 25(a)(2)(ii) of the DOC Regulations and the Final Results of Third
Review bases on that provision were consistent with the United States obligation under article 1 1 .2
of the Antidumping Agreement.
The panel submitted its interim report on 23 October 1998, its final report on 4 December 1998. In
its final report, the panel stated that
,
* The United States submission did not develop any detailed argument for the justification of the
"not likely" criterion prescribed in section 353 25(a)(2)(ii) of DOC Regulation, and
* The United States submission could be construed to argue that the necessity of the continued
imposition of the duty may be somehow more directly warranted by a finding that it is not
possible to determine that recurrence of dumping is "not likely" WT/DS99/R, para.6.49.
As well, the panel report concluded that
;
(i) Section 353 25(a)(2)(ii) ofDOC Regulation is not consistent with article 1 12 of the
Antidumping Agreement, WT/DS99/R, para.6 54, para 7.1.
(ii)Final Results of Third Review, based on and determined by section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) of DOC
Regulation, is thereby also inconsistent with article 112 of the Antidumping Agreement.
WT/DS99/R, para.6.55, para.7.
1
The panel report recommended also that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to
bring section 353 25(a)(ii) and the Final Result Third Review into conformity with its obligations
under Article 1 1.2 [Review of Antidumping Duties]of the Antidumping Agreement. WT/DS99/R,
para. 7.2.
On 19 March 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body adopted the Report of the Panel
On 19 May 1999, the United States and Korea agreed that a reasonable period of time for
implementing the DSB's recommendation and rulings would be 8 months, a period ending on 19
November 1999.
On 2 September 1999, the United States amended new section 351 222(b) to delete "not likely"
standard and replaced it with a requirement that the Secretary of Commerce consider "whether the
continued application of the antidumping duty order is necessary to otTset dumping." 64
Fed.Reg.5 1,236
Yet, the United States refused to revoke the antidumping duty order, stating that the Commerce
concluded that "based on the facts before it [the Commerce], a resumption of dumping was likely"
and "it was necessary to leave the anti-dumping duty order in place." WT/DS99/6 Para. 5,9.
On 10 March 2000, Korea requested for the establishment of a compliance panel arguing that the
US;
* has not adopted a revocation standard consistent with the panel and appellate body findings,
adopting instead a standard that increased the Commerce Department's discretion.
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5. Procedural administration is hardly rational.
United States antidumping law is administered to foreigners in an unfair manner
which is not supposed to happen under the United States due process of law. Conceding
that foreign respondents are not entitled to the nghts enjoyed by the United States citizens
under the United States laws, the procedural administration has really tampered with
foreign respondents."^^ The following excerpt explains the circumstances quite clearly.
[I]magine a system of civil litigation in which a party serves a massive discovery
request, consisting of interrogatories and requests for production of documents.
Imagine further that the serving party has the sole authority to prescribe the time
within which response must be made and the format (such as to require multiple
copies and translation into English of all requested documents originally
prepared in a foreign language). Imagine still further that the serving party is the
sole judge of the adequacy of the response and of the merits of all objections as
to relevancy or burdensomeness of the request; that the serving party also is the
imposer of sanctions for failure to comply, and the ultimate decision-maker in
the underlying matter for which the information is sought. Such a system would
be intolerable in the state or federal courts of the United States. It would raise
serious questions of due process in a system of administrative law that separates
the investigative from the judicial function within a single agency. But this is the
inquisitorial system that was ordained by Congress for the administration of the
antidumping (and countervailing) duty provisions of Title VII of the Tariff Act
of 1930. — this is hardly a recommendation for the system. It should be
changed.
"^*^
* did not properly apply even its new standard of revocation, using instead the existing standard to
justify keeping the duties in effect, and
* failed to publish these results in the Federal Register, violating its notification obligations in the
Antidumping Agreement and GATT Inside US Trade, Vol 18, No 12, March 24, 2000.
Will the DKAMS turn out to be another Banana (WT/ DS27/R/USA et al)^
^^^ See, How the (lATTAffecis If.S. Antidumping ami Countervailiti^ Duty Policy, United States
Congressional Budget Office, Sept. 1994, at 41-50, cited in Corr, supra note 88, at 101
^^^ N David Palmeter, Torquemada atid the TariffAct: The Inquisitor Rides Again, 20 Int'l Law 641, 641
(1986), reprinted in Mcgee, supra note 18, at 496
See, also, David Rushford, Antitrust versus Antidumping: revisiting the Antidumping Act of 1916, 3
U.C.Davis J. int'l L (fePoTy 85(1997), discussing the United States protectionist administration of
antidumping law Id at 96-99. ,
In consideration that antidumping proceedings conducted by the ITA and ITC are not required to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 19 U S.C.A § 1677c, the Administrative Law
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One problem with the present system is the short period of time in which to conduct
and complete the investigation. In general, the Commerce Department must make a
preliminary and a final determination of dumping within 140 and 215 days each from the
date the investigation is initiated. "^'" That might be sufficient time if the Commerce
Department just asked for a few bits of basic information, and the short time deadlines
would speed up the process. However, the Commerce Department requests much more
than just a few pieces of information. The standard questionnaire demands information
covering all sales both in the United States and the company's home market for a six
month period."^'' The data must be in a mandatory computer tape format. "^'^ Much of what
it demands is not useful, but is demanded so as to avoid criticism from the petitioner for
Judge (ALJ) under the frame of APA was proposed as a remedy to this procedural problem. See,
Michael A.Lawrence, Bias in the Intenialional Trade Administralion: The Needfor Impartial Decision
Makers in United States Antidumping Procedures, 26 Case W Res.J.Int'l L. 1(1994), stating as follows;
[A]s stated in the legislative history to the 1979 Trade Agreements Act: "[While the]
hearings in antidumping duty investigations
.
. are not subject to the provisions of Title 5
of the United States Code relating to adjudicative hearings, they must be conducted in a
manner designed to permit fijll presentation of information and views " S Rep No 249, 96""
Cong., ist Sess.97(1979) Judging from this language. Congress appears to have based its
decision that antidumping proceedings need not comply with the requirements of the APA
at least in part on its characterization of such proceedings as solely investigative, while the
APA provisions relate to adjudications Id at 19.
[Ajntidumping proceedings are sufficiently "adjudicative" to be covered by the APA In
any event, the time has come for Congress to act on this matter Perceptions in the trade
community that the ITA does not administer US antidumping laws impartially have
become sufficiently serious in recent years to warrant Congress stepping in with legislation
requiring the use of ALJs in the ITA's antidumping proceedings /c/at 20
260
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The Commerce Department may extend a preliminary antidumping investigation for 50 more days and
the final determination for 60 days, under certain critical circumstances. 19 U.S.C.§1673b(b) and
§1673d(a).
[T]he average antidumping questionnaire is more than seventy pages long, single spaced Companies
have forty-five to sixty days to reply. But before they can reply, they must translate the questionnaire
into their language, distribute it to numerous company employees who will be working on various
aspects of the questionnaire, determine what information has to be reported, then gather it, read and
digest it. It is only then that they will be able to respond to the Commerce Department's demands for
data See. McGee, supra note 18, at 498-99, citing Bovard, The Fair Trade Fraud, at 135 ( 1991 ) This
situation stays the same until now
Until very recently, the questionnaire demanded many of the statistical data be submitted in
IBM-compatible computer tapes only.
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not being thorough enough."' If the targeted exporter or manufacturer thinks that the
requirements being imposed by the Commerce Department are loo onerous, there is no
effective appeal, because the Commerce Department determines what is enough, as well
as when and how it should be presented. "^'^ Of course, the target company can go to the
Court of International Trade,"^'^ but that is costly and time-consuming, and the Commerce
Department can exclude any information the target company wishes to present as not
being in confomiity with its own administrative requirements.^ ^
The Commerce Department can demand practically an infinite amount of
information and can enforce on-the-spot verification of the data and information
"t /- -7 TAX
submitted" ~ and any refusal to comply is taken as a confession of guilt," after which
it imposes the highest possible dumping margins.^^^ The Commerce Department collects
vast amounts of confidential information from foreign businesses and has frequently
allowed this information to fall into the hands of American competitors. 270
See, McGee, supra note 18, at 497, citing Palmeter, supra note 259, at 646.
Palmeter has written this comment in the year of 1986, but the problem still goes on as it did .
^^'' [Mjatsushita, a Japanese manufacturer of electronic and electric equipment, withdrew from an
antidumping case involving small business telephone systems, thereby abandoning more than $50
million in export sales, because of the irrational requirements imposed by the Commerce Department.
On a Friday afternoon, it received a demand by the Commerce Department to translate 3,000 pages of
Japanese financial documents into English by the following Monday morning Investigation
73 l-TA-426 See, Bovard, supra note 186, at 136, cited by McGee, supra note 18, at 499.
^^^ There was a calling for the abolition of the Court of International Trade, because the multilayer review
process that results from its existence is too time consuming and costly, suggesting its duties be
performed by administrative law judges, and regular district courts, with appellate review. See, Kevin
C Kennedy, A Proposal to Abolish the US Court of International Trade, 14 Dick J Int'l L 13-37
(1985), cited in McGee, supra note 18, at 497, note 34.
^^^ See, McGee, supra note 18, at 497, citing Palmeter, at 646-47.
See, Glossary ofTerms for "verification" < http://www.ita.doc.gov/import_admin/records/glossary.
html >
^^^ 19U.S.C§1677e(b)
^^^ See, Patrick F J Macrory, Acimmistration of the U.S. Antidumping Law by the Department of
Commerce, 722 PLUComm 9, 20-21(1995).
^^'^ James Bovard, No Justice in Anti-Dumping, N.Y. Times, January 28, 1990, at F13, col. 2., cited in
McGee, supra note 1 8, at 499.
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While the United States current antidumping law is accredited for its comparatively
fair and objective operation to those of other countries,^^' it nonetheless has a moral
problem of forcing foreign exporters to artificially manipulate various data to their
interest, so as not to be excluded by dumping decision from the United States market
without which they could hardly survive. In reality, many foreign competitive producers
are excluded from the United States market simply because they could not meet the
accounting standard required for data preparation.
It should be seriously questioned whether the United States antidumping laws
really do good to the United States national economy when foreign competitive suppliers
are excluded by the government's arbitrary decision of dumping, only to be substituted
by other foreign producers with a higher, but still could-be-below-cost price.
^^' See, Corr, supra note 88, at 101
SECTION V
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. Why a Change?
Since the antidumping laws cannot be justified for the reasons discussed above, it
logically follows that antidumping laws must be repealed, the sooner the better."^" But
curiously, antidumping laws are getting even more prevalent all around the world."
Statistics show that antidumping measures have increased more extensively, and are now
exploited by developed and developing countries alike. "^"^ This reality suggests that there
must be some reasons for this irrational movement in reverse.
First, domestically, the consumers, the outright victims to the antidumping laws, do
not realize that they are suffering from the antidumping laws by paying higher price and
losing more job opportunities."^^ And, even if they did realize it, they would rarely
demand their repeal in opposition to the outcry from the proponents of the antidumping
laws who are, in most cases, their employers. Further, consumers in general like to see
the antidumping laws protect their present jobs, rather than wait and see lower prices and
more job opportunities realized by repealing antidumping laws." ' Consumers view
^^^
See, McGee, stdpra note 18, at 561.
"^
See, Table 1 and Table 2, at 43 and 44.
""
Id
"'
See, supra note 1 90.
^^'' This is clearly explained by the concepts of "What is seen" and "What is not seen" See, McGee, supra
note M/, at 538-39, citing F Bastiat, What /.v Seen and What Is Not Seen, in Selected Essays on Political
Economy 1-50 (1964) illustrating as follows
[Wjhile coming up with exact numbers to measure the job gains and losses of a particular policy
may be difficult, it is not too difficult to see that implementing a policy that results in higher prices
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antidumping laws from their personal interest and place a higher value on current
employment than on the remote and speculative economic welfare enjoyable only in the
future by repealing antidumping laws. To them, it is simply better to have one bird now
in the hand than to try and catch a few later in the bush."^ Moreover, while the
proponents for antidumping laws are well organized in industrial groups that can speak
loudly for their interest in a concerted voice, consumers are a large number of
unorganized individuals, dispersed around the nation, totally unprepared to fight for their
common interests. Political leaderships will not be likely to repeal the antidumping laws,
because many of them do not, or will not, see the other side of the antidumping law.
Worrying about the imminent risk of losing political support by not doing so, they listen
to the voracious demand of domestic industry clamoring for this law of protectionist
nature." The administrative - the Commerce Department - is even more unlikely to
repeal antidumping law, understandably. Only some scholars and experts have argued for
the repeal," ^ but they were rarely heard or fell upon deaf ears.
Second, internationally, the world is becoming more and more of a global village in
so far as the international trade is concerned. The globalization of individual country's
economies have been accelerated at such a speed through international trade talks, that
the borderless economy is becoming true to the letter. Economic globalization is
reduces total welfare and employment. If consumers have to spend an extra $3,000 for a Japanese
(or American) car, then they will have $3,000 less to spend on something else They will not be
able to buy the motorboat they want because they will have to spend the $3,000 on the car What
is seen is the automobile purchase What is not seen is the boat, which cannot be bought ~ or
even made ~ because of the policy to raise auto prices The company that manufactures
motorboats, the retailer who sells them and the sales person who works for the retailer all lose
because the boat is not purchased Yet they do not even know they are losing because they have
no way of knowing that the consumer who bought the car would have also bought a boat if only
there were enough money to buy both.
277
See generally, McGee, supra note 18, at 559-561.
"«
Id.
^^^ See, i.e., supra note 3.
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emerging as a grave challenge to national economies which are not yet ready or
competent enough to maintain their economic identity in the face of significant surges in
imported goods and services. For developing countries, with no other means of protecting
their national economy trom more competitive imports, antidumping laws are the
simplest measure of protection with the least obligations under the framework of
WTO.^ " For developed countries, they have no reason to lead in the repealing of this
traditional means of protection that they have enjoyed so long. Instead, they simply keep
using antidumping laws, while curbing arbitrary use by developing countries. Hence, it is
practically improbable in international society to expect a voice advocating for the repeal
of antidumping law. Some support for mere improvements in certain substantive or
procedural matters might be the most one could expect from international trade talks on
antidumping laws.
With these circumstances being the case, the antidumping laws will not be repealed
in a foreseeable future," rather they will exist with a little occasional changes under the
agreement among conflicting interests of the member countries of the WTO. The most
that could be done is; ( 1 ) to change the operational scheme of antidumping law so that its
abuse be minimized; then, (2) to transfomri it into a better scheme applicable by
developing and developed countries alike.
For example, over half of the 93 antidumping measures against the United States during 1987-1997
have been imposed by its NAFTA partners: Canada (28measures) and Mexico (25) J Miranda et al,
supra note 8, at 37
^^' There is a strong doubt on the possibility of eliminating antidumping regime
See, J Miranda et al, supra note 8, at 61, saying that "[A]s antidumping does serve a valid political
purpose in many country's view, it is not likely to be proscribed in the foreseeable future
"
See also, J Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 681, saying that antidumping laws have strong supporters in
the United States Congress that it seems unlikely they will disappear in the near fijture.
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B. What Should Be the Investigating Authority of the Antidumping i.aw ?
The Anti dumping Agreement has detailed regulations on the antidumping schemes
to be operated by member states. These detailed regulations are purposed to support free
international trade by curbmg member state's arbitrary use of antidumping schemes as
trade barriers. Nevertheless, due to the broad range of discretion granted to the
administering authorities, the antidumpmg duty scheme is prone to fall into arbitrary
operation, even at times rendering support to the administermg authorities seeking to
resort to procedural discretion where substantive matters are no longer effective in
maintaining the antidumping duty order." Actually, it is unrealistic to expect the
^^^ Antidumping Agreement, part II, art 16 and 17.
Typical case of this nature is United States Imposition of AntiJumping Duties on Imports ofColor
Television Receivers from Korea, WT/DS89/7 The chronological development of the case is as follows:
— On 30 April 1984, the United States imposed anti-dumping duties on Color TVs exported from
Korea to the United States. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. ("Samsung") is one of the Korean
producers affected by this anti-dumping duty order.
— Since the issuance of the order, Samsung has requested for administrative reviews, and the
Commerce Department has determined that Samsung did not sell Color TVs in the United States at
dumped prices from I April 1985 through 31 March 1991.
— Since 1 April 1991, Samsung has ceased to export Color TVs to the United States
— In the mean time, Samsung has made four separate requests for administrative review and
revocation based on its history of no dumping and no export. But the United States rejected the
review request each time on the ground of the lack ofcurrent data as a result of "no shipment"
from Samsung (emphasis added) WT/DS89/7, page 2.
— On 20 July 1995, Samsung again has requested for revocation of the antidumping duty order.
— On 10 August 1995, several labor unions (i.e., the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers, and the
Industrial Union Department) filed a petition for anti-circumvention investigation (which Korea
presumed to be targeting Samsung)
— On 19 January 1996, the Commerce Department initiated an anti-circumvention investigation.
— On 24 June 1996, the Commerce Department decided to initiate the administrative review Samsung
has requested 1 1 months ago
— By 7 November 1997 (when Korea decided to sue the United States with the WTO), no
determination in the anti-circumvention investigation has yet been made, while the United States is
taking the position that the review determination must await the outcome ofthe anti- circumvention
investigation (emphasis added).
— On 10 July 1997, Korea requested consultations with the United States pursuant to Article 4 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article
XXll: 1 of the GATT 1994, and Article 17 of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement with respect to
the continuing imposition of antidumping measures on Korean Color Television Receivers.
WT/DS89/1 andCorr 1
— Consultations were held on 7 August 1997 and on 8 October 1997, with no mutually satisfactory
solution reached.
%
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importing country to refrain from arbitrarily using antidumping schemes so far as the
administering authority is under the political influence from domestic industries which
usually have incompetitive marginal enterprises. Therefore, an international
organization free from the political pressure of domestic industry should be entrusted to
investigate dumping and injury in an objective and neutral way. Under the current order
of international trade, the WTO is the most suitable body to take on this task. The WTO
On 7 November 1997, Korea requests the establishment of a Panel in accordance with Article 6 of
the DSU, Article XXIII:2 of GATT 1994 and Articles 17 4 and 17 5 of the Antidumping
Agreement, claiming that the United States has improperly relied on the initiation and pendency of
the anti-circumvention investigation as a basis for refusing to revoke the anti-dumping duty order
on Color TVs with respect to Samsung WT/DS89/7, p. 1,2.
On 19 December 1997, the United States terminated the anti-circumvention investigation, and made
a Preliminary Determination to Revoke the Anti-Dumping Duty Order with respect to Samsung
On 15 January 1998, Korea withdrew its request for the establishment of panel with the reservation
that it would reintroduce the request if the United States final determination differ from the
preliminary determination WT/DS89/8.
On 27 August 1998, the United States made a final determination to revoke the antidumping duty.
On 15 September 1998, Korea notified the WTO/DSB that it would not seek tlirther consideration
on this matter WT/DS89/9
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For discussion on the effect of politics on the antidumping investigations by the ITA and ITC, see,
Michael A Lawrence, Bias in the Inlemational rraJe Administration: The Need for Impartial Decision
Makers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 Case W.Res.J.Int'l L. 1, 1 1-16 (1994).
[S]ince the Assistant secretary of the ITA and the Commissioners at the ITC are presidential
appointees, confirmed by the Senate, — [the concern is] that these individuals might tih their
[antidumping] decisions in favor of domestic industry because of their connection with the political
process. Moreover, lower echelon employees might act to favor domestic interests on the belief that
such favoritism would be noticed by their superiors and redound to the benefit of their careers over the
long run Id, at 12
[T]here has developed a serious erosion of the trade community's confidence in the ITA's ability to
render impartial and evenhanded antidumping decisions This perception of bias in an administrative
proceeding runs counter to the image of fairness and impartiality that the US government seeks to
project in any forum — informal or formal. Id si 13.
[T]he ITC, on the other hand, with its quasi-judicial procedure and greater independence from political
branches of government, is less susceptible to political pressure than the ITA in rendering its
antidumping injury determinations, /t/at 13.
For these reasons, Canada was insistent in including a binational panel review process in antidumping
and (countervailing) duty disputes under the U.S.- Canada Free Trade Agreement and North American
Free Trade Agreement (both under chapter 19). /t/at 13 Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 690
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should be the final detenniner of dumping and injury. Member states should simply be
sincere executors of the decisions the WTO has rendered."
C. What Should Succeed the Antidumping Regime ?
As discussed, antidumping laws do not have plausible rationale for the national
economy as a whole, and in practice have fallen to a means of a protectionist instrument
for arbitrary use by the government of the importing country. The arbitrary use of
antidumping laws will last in as long as the antidumping mechanism exists. The WTO
could act as an impartial authority for objective operation of antidumping mechanism, but
it is only a temporary measure to counter this problem. Something fundamental should be
created.
1 . Antitrust as an alternative
In the United States, many scholars propose ; the abolition of antidumping law,
merging its remedial effect with antitrust laws" and other trade related laws" dealing
unfair international trade practices, " or ; the harmonization of antidumping and antitrust
laws, minimizing, to the extent possible, protectionist abuses of trade laws so that
consumers and producers may benefit from increased competition and lower prices, and
concurrently protecting domestic industries from foreign dumping activity."
^^^ This proposal could be discussed at the coming New Round of trade talk commenced in December
1 999 in Seattle. See, supra note 7.
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Section 2 of Sherman Act, 15 U S.C.§ 2
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,19 U.S.C § 241 1, or Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
.SVt', Schoenbaum, supra note 2, p.2,23, Bailey, supra note 57, p 447,449-50.
See, }^enerally, Christopher M Barbuto, Toward Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law\ 62 Fordham
L Rev. 2047, 2087 (1994), discussing harmonization of United States antidumping law with the
Robinson-Patman Act.
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These proposals are reasonable, especially where the export price is so low as to be
regarded predatory" * and against competing domestic industry of the importing country.
However, competition laws are very diverse, and their scope changes from one
country to another."^' In order for the domestic antidumping laws to take the place of
antidumping laws, some legal preparations are required beforehand, as antitrust laws are
basically not purposed for application on international trade, specifically on import
restriction. Taking the competition laws of the United States as an example, the current
extraterritorial reach of antitrust law is dependent upon personal jurisdiction and a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States commerce." " It is
not clear that U.S. antitrust laws can reach business activities taking place outside of
United States borders absent a showing of direct and intended effect on United States
commerce." Furthermore, the present international application of U.S. antitrust law is
For discussions on predatory pricing by the United States Supreme Court, see: Utah Pie Company v.
CoiUinenlal Banking Co., 386 US 685 (1969) ; Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) , Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) and
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown (<- Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993)
In Utah Pie, the Court took the view that a finding of predatory behavior was dependent on a
showing of intent In Matsushita and Cargill, the Court favored identifying predatory behavior through
some cost-based test, but failed to define what that test should be. In Brooke, the Court set out two
conditions for establishing the existence of predatory behavior (i) prices must be below cost, and (ii)
there must be reasonable prospects for recoupment.
See, Jorge Miranda, Should the Antidumping Law he Dumped ?, 28 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus
255,278(1996).
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United States competition laws, as an example, may be classified under four broad categories:
(i) laws against price-discrimination
,
as in the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U S C § 13 ( 194),
(ii)laws against the restraint of trade, e.g., by means of horizontal pricing arrangements, the allocation of
markets on a geographical basis, etc
,
as in section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 US C § 1 (1994),
(iii)laws against attempts to monopolize (either as a producer or as a buyer, as in section 2 of the
Sherman Act , 1
5
USC§2 (1994), and
(iv)laws regulating mergers or acquisitions that have the effect of lessening competition, as in the
Clayton Act, 15
use § 18 (1994). See, Miranda, supra note M/, at 267
15 use {j 6a,( 1) ( 1988), 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(3) (1982).
See, United States v. Aluminum Co
,
148 F 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.1945), stating that activities conducted
with an intended effect on U.S. consumers or exports may lie within U.S. antitrust laws; and,
Timherlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAm., N.T. ct- S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir.1976), stating that
"The Sherman Act is not limited to trade restraints which have both a direct and substantial effect on
US foreign commerce "
67
limited by the act of state and foreign sovereign compulsion defenses, which concede de
facto immunity to acts of a foreign sovereign or its agent.^'^'*
Many countries have antidumping laws, but not yet such developed ones as those of
the United States, and they are required to develop antitrust laws in substitution to
antidumping laws. Also, the application of antitrust laws to international trade, especially
on imports, should be discussed in international trade talks for establishing a fair and
objective standard for both domestic and international trade."''^^ in sum, the international
antitrust regime has a long way to go before it can adequately address exporters' sale at
less than fair value.^^^
2. From Antidumping to Safeguard
Dumping is punishable when it causes material injury to the domestic industry of the
importing country. More specifically, so long as not inflicting injury to domestic
industry, dumping is not punished, however big or small the dumping margin may be.
^'^^
( 1 ) In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.759( 1972), Justice Brennan stated
in dissenting that certain acts of foreign sovereigns are political questions and are not to be resolved by
the judicial branch, /J at 787-88 & n 11;
(2) In In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F 2d 238 (3d Cir 1983), the court assumed,
without deciding, that "a government-mandated export cartel arrangement fixing minimum export
prices would be outside the ambit of section 1 of the Sherman Act", /J at 3 1 5 ;
(3) In Timherlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.. N.T. & S.A., 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir 1976), the court
stated that "corporate conduct which is compelled by a foreign sovereign is also protected from antitrust
liability ", /J at 606.
(4) Bill cf, Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatnck. Inc , 847 F 2d 1052 (3d Cir 1988), where the
court stated that "act of state doctrine does not bar consideration of a suit against a company that had
been awarded a foreign government procurement contract where plaintiff alleged that contract was
received through bribery, because the inquiry involved at most an inquiry into motivations behind,
rather than legality of, foreign government's acts.", /t/at 1062. Cert, granted, 109 S.Ct. 3213 (1989).
Cf, Benz, stipra note 22, at 723-26.
This proposal could be discussed at the coming New Round of trade talk commenced in December
1999 in Seattle. See, supra note 7.
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Secretary of State Shultz noted the problem: "[Ujnless they are managed or mitigated by the community
of nations, these conflicts of jurisdiction have the potential to interfere seriously with the smooth
functioning of international relations " George P Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of
Jurisdiction, 36 S.C L REV 295, 296 (1985), cited in Benz, supra note 22, at 734
'I
•
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This means that antidumping law is nothing but a legal mechanism established for the
purpose of providing relief to the domestic industry injured by import."^^ Then, it is the
right direction to achieve the protection of domestic industry from more competitive
import by means of a safeguard mechanism,"'^** which is duly established under the
auspice of WTO/GATT for the purpose of remedying the industrial injury caused by
import and affording time to improve their position or shift their resources into another
field of industry.^^'^
As antidumping laws do not have plausible rational to operate, governments
maintaining the antidumping scheme are urged to consider abolishing their antidumping
laws more positively. In parallel with the abolition of domestic antidumping laws, the
^" In BaJger-Fowhcilan. Div. ofFiggie Intern., Inc. v. U.S.. CIT. 608 F Supp 653, 9 C I T 213 (1985), the
court stated that "[AJntidumping law is remedial, not punitive, in nature; it was designed to protect
domestic industry from sales of imported merchandise at less than fair value which either caused or
threatened to cause injury."
An illustrative case of this nature is the United States import restriction on Tomato from Mexico
— On 3 April 1995, USITC initiated a safeguard investigation on the import of tomato on the basis of
petition from Florida Tomato Exchange, et.al 60 FR 16883
— The case was withdrawn on 1 1 May 1995, because US tomato producers failed to prove injury by
reason of import surge, primarily from Mexico. 60 Fed Reg. 25248.
— On 25 April 1996, the US industry then brought an antidumping case against Mexico on imports
of tomato. 61 Fed.Reg. 18377
(With the initiation of the investigation, Mexico filed a Request for Consultation with the United
States. WTO/DSB. WT/DS49/I, 9 July 1996).
— After obtaining a preliminary decision on dumping margins on Mexican tomato imports ranging
from 4 16% to 188 85%, the US domestic complainants agreed to settle the case by means of a
suspension agreement under which Mexican producers must report periodically to the US
Commerce Department that they are selling above a minimum price Investigation terminated 61
Fed. Reg. 56608 (Nov. 1,1996)
^^ Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A : Multilateral Agreements on Trade
in Goods, Agreement on Safeguards ("Safeguard Agreemenf ). See, 19 U.S.C.201-204.
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See, Bailey, stipra note 57, at 449-50, saying that "[The] economic interests of the United States,
domestic producers and labor, and United States consumers would be better served by abandoning the
current United States antidumping laws."
But See, Josephs, .supra note Jo/, at 72-73, citing J Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of
Antidumping Regulation, in Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt (J. Michael Finger ed.,
1993), p.68-69,
as saying "[A]nother argument in favor of the US antidumping laws is that they are necessary in
today's world economy The negotiation of suspension agreements and voluntary restraint agreements
have been necessary in a world trading system which does not yet operate according to perfect free
market principles
"
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Antidumping Agreement should also be removed from the legal structure of the
WTO/GATT. The vacancy of injury relief resulting from the removal of antidumping
scheme can be filled by the safeguard scheme. What is better about the safeguard scheme
is that, unlike the antidumpmg protection, the safeguard mechanism is operated
irrespective of whether the pricing is fair or unfair, thus eliminating the room for
governmental intervention inevitably made in the course of fixing the dumping margin. ^°'
3. Modification of the Requirement for Invocation of Safeguard Measure.
Safeguard was not relied upon as much for the remedy of industrial injury caused by
import as antidumping or countervailing duty; partly because the safeguard mechanism
was introduced to the GATT/WTO after the antidumping mechanism has already taken
hold as a regulatory rule;
''
"" but rather and mainly because importing countries did not
like the strict requirements necessary for its invocation, ' thus sought protection for their
domestic industries by using '"grey area" measures, such as the voluntary export restraint
agreement. ^°'* With the obligation of WTO member countries to gradually phase out the
grey area measures,"*^''^ the significance of the safeguard mechanism is growing, but still
^'" Export price or value, further the exporter's engagement in unfair practice is not elements for
consideration in invoking the safeguard measure Safeguard Agreement, art 4 2.
^°^ As an international trade scheme purposed to provide relief to domestic industry subject to competition
intensified by import, antidumping duty was introduced in the latter part of the 19th century, when
safeguard (escape) measure was not yet conceived as a generalized mechanism of relief from injury
caused by import. See, J.Jackson, supra note 105, at 604, 684.
For a safeguard measure to be taken, there must be an "increase in import" to cause a "serious injury"
to the domestic industry. Safeguard Agreement, art.2. 1.
Safeguard measures are not allowed to last longer than 4 years in principle, and may not be revoked for
the period equal to the previous application period, /i/art.7 1, 7 5
Safeguard measures must be liberalized progressively during the period of application, and must be
reviewed for the possibility of removal /J art 7.4.
Compensation must be made to the country affected adversely by the safeguard measure (Or, retaliation
is allowed ) /c/ art 8.1.
'"''
See, WTO Annual Report, 1999, Voll, p. 52.
Safeguard Agreement, art. i 1 .2.
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the safeguard measure is not as actively used as other means of protection having
comparatively less strict requirements for invocation, such as antidumping law. 306
/ Table 3 /
Safeguard Investigation and Definitive Measures by Reporting Country
Investigations Definitive Measures
Country * Year '95 '96 '97 '98 Total '95 '96 '97 '98 Total
Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Colombia
Czech Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
India
Korea
Latvia
Slovak Rep
Slovenia
United States
2 11.1
1 5.6
1 56
1 5.6
I 5.6
1 56
1 56
2 111
2 11.1
1 5 6
:
1 5.6
1 5.6 \
16.7
Total 18 100.0 5 U
%
18.2
27.3
1 9 1
1 9.1
1 9.1
27.3
100.0
Source ; WTO Annual Report 1995-1998
Note : 1. "-" means no investigation or definitive measure was made for the respective year
2. Each member country enumerated in the WTO Annual Reports to have taken investigation or
definitive measure was counted in this Table to have taken each one action for the year, as the
Report does not specify the exact number of the actions taken by each country enumerated.
For the safeguard measure to take the place of antidumping duty as a means of
providing relief from competitive import, the substantive requirements for its invocation
need to be modified, so that its relief becomes more available to the developing and
^"*' But reflecting the importance of safeguard measure as a means of relief from import surge, the number
of safeguard investigation is growing rapidly, from 3 in 1995 to 9 countries in 1998. See, Table 3.
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developed countries alike. The need for moderation of more convenient access to
safeguard measure is conspicuous, among others, in the requirement of serious injury,
selectivity, application period and compensation.
a. Serious injury
Safeguard measure is permissible only when serious injury (or threat thereof) to the
domestic industry has occurred from the increase in imports. " As a requirement for
invoking a safeguard measure, "serious injury" is understood as requiring a higher
standard of deliberation than the "material injury" required for invoking the antidumping
duty measure. The reasoning behind this different treatment is that the antidumping
duty is a "legitimate" punitive measure against "unfair " trade practices, whereas the
safeguard measure is an "exceptional" restriction on a "not unfair" trade, executable to
the benefit of the imposing member state.
The interpretation of "serious injury" should be moderated to the level of "material
injury" for the investigating authority to find in favor of the domestic industry.
b. Selectivity
In the antidumping scheme, the importing country may select countries for
antidumping actions. This discriminatory targeting, though contrary to the principle of
Most Favored Nation under the WTO/GATT, has worked for the importing countries as
an effective mechanism of import restriction which does not invite an attack from all
exporting countries, only a few targeted ones.
In contrast, the selective discrimination is not allowed in applying safeguard
^"^ Safeguard Agreement, art.2.1., 19 US. C. 225 1(a)
^"'*
J Jackson, supra note 105, at 718
See, Corr, supra note 88, at p.61.
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measures.^
^'^ During the trade talks of the Uruguay Round of GATT, the selective
application of safeguard measure was among the most controversial issues discussed
between the importing developed countries (represented by the European Union), arguing
for selectivity for effective operation of safeguard measures, and the exporting
developing countries arguing for the application of Most Favored Nation treatment for
fear of the recurrence of such discriminatory measures as Voluntary Export Restraint or
Orderly Market Arrangement. The end decision was not to approve selective treatment,
but this conclusion was made under the political negotiation of give-and-take for the
purpose of accomplishing the Single Undertaking during the final phase of Uruguay
Round.
With reference to this historical background of selectivity and the reason for
preference of antidumping measures to safeguard measures, selective application of
safeguard measures could be reconsidered among developed and developing countries
upon repealing antidumping laws.
c. Duration
The duration of safeguard measures is also limited ; they may be imposed only for
four years initially, with a possible four-year extension if the injury is found to persist and
the industry can show it has begun to adjust. " The absolute limit for safeguard actions is
eight years, after which all measures must be removed. ^'"^ Safeguard actions on the same
"° Safeguard Agreement art. 2.
2
The only exception to the prohibition of selectivity is where quota (as a means of safeguard measure) is
distributed among exporters without prior agreement under such unusual circumstances as where the
import from a certain country has increased at a disproportionately high rate immediately before the
application of quota, etc. Safeguard Agreement art 5 2(b).
Safeguards Agreement, art. 7 1, 7.2. When safeguard measures are applied for more than three years, the
administering authority must conduct a mid-term review to ensure the measure is still necessary to
prevent injury, or whether it should be withdrawn or more swiftly phased out Id art 7 4
"^ M art.7.3.
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product generally may not be initiated for a period equal to the time period in which the
measures were in effect, and in any event cannot be applied again for at least two
years.
^^^
This rather tight limit on duration and application of the safeguard measure is actually
a consideration for the dismissal of selectivity to developed countries, a consideration
agreed upon at the concluding phase of the Uruguay Round talks. This rigid regulation on
safeguard measures could be renegotiated to perniit as much flexibility in operation as are
currently allowed by the Antidumping Agreement.
d. Compensation
The Safeguard Agreement requires for member countries to maintain substantially
equivalent levels of concessions before and after the invocation of the safeguard
measure. '^ Consequently, the invoking country has to compensate for the losses incurred
on the exporting country by the safeguard measure, or it has to face retaliatory actions by
the exporting country. '^ While the compensation requirement was substantially
moderated at the Uruguay Round talks,""^ it still is one of the main reasons discouraging
mainly the developing countries from invoking safeguard measures, ' as the
compensation would offset the benefit to be derived from import restriction, which was
purposed by the developed countries in the Uruguay Round trade talks. Further, it would
Id. art. 7.5. There is a limited exception for safeguard measures of 180 days or less, which can be
applied only when one year has passed since imposition of the safeguard measure and the measure has
not been applied on the same product more than twice in the preceding five years Id art 7 6
^'^ Safeguard Agreement art. 8. 1
.
"^ /Jart.8.2.
[l]t is possible that negotiations over compensation will regularly fil to achieve accord, and that the
first three years of safeguards measures in most cases will be undertaken without compensation being
given and without retaliation J Jackson et al, supra note 105, at 654.
"^ /c/ at 653.
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be politically a tricky burden for the invoking government to find a scapegoat concession
in return for introducing a safeguard measure, and this political burden will keep WTO
member countries relying on antidumping measures in preference to safeguard measures
as a means of relief from import.
The present rule allows waiver of compensation, but only when the safeguard
measure was taken as a result of "absolute" increase in import and only for 3 years.
Expansion of waiver of compensation should be discussed more positively to
encourage the invocation of safeguard measures in the place of antidumping measures
which do not burden the invoking country with a compensation requirement.
Safeguard Agreement art 8 3.
SECTION VI
CONCLUSION
A number of approaches were proposed to keep antidumping laws from
protectionist abuse. Some have proposed reforming antidumping rules for curbing only
the predatory actions, ' but this approach does not seem as effective a method of
controlling protectionist use, as the discernment of predatory actions from non-predatory
ones would be practically impossible. Another notable approach is to introduce a public
interest test into antidumping practice with a view to limiting imposition of antidumping
measures to cases where such a measure is consistent with public interest.'^" This
approach is reasonable, but much work has to be done to make such tests easily
applicable. Another approach is to reform antidumping law so as to include a greater
degree of economic analysis into the investigation of the cases. This is a more realistic
approach, but its effectiveness in achieving a heightened resuh is doubtful, as
antidumping investigations will keep being protectionist in nature, giving more room for
the domestic government to make arbitrary decisions. The best approach to the problem
of dumping would be to identify and eliminate the environment in which dumping
thrives. The fundamental condition for dumping is that the exporter may enjoy a
protected home market that restricts competition and allows monopoly pricing necessary
^'^ Supra note 5, where Bhagwati believes that trade remedies "have legitimate roles to play in a free trade
regime — but not if they are captured and misused as protectionist instruments" and proposes "to
minimize the capture of antidumping (and countervailing duty) mechanism by protectionist for the
purpose of harassment and trade restriction."
^^" For more details in this approach, See, Marco C E J Bronckers, Rehahi/itating Antidumping and Other
Trade Remedies Through Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30(2) Journal of World Trade 5 (1996).
'^' See, J Miranda et al, supra note 8, at 62.
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to finance the dumping in importing countries/'^" Without this protected home market,
arbitrage would ehminate the exporter's ability to receive monopoly prices. In this
context, the direct negotiation with exporting nation governments for the removal of trade
barriers would be an idea in the right direction; ^'^^ however, it is unrealistic to expect the
complete elimination of trade barriers through trade negotiations, because it is our
experience that countries have been devising tariff or nontariff, visible or invisible trade
barriers immediately following the removal of such barriers. This hide-and-seek game of
trade barriers will last so long as the individual country is ruled by a government which is
entrusted with the duty of protecting its own economy, if necessary, at the cost of the
national economy other than its own. So far as each national authority is allowed to apply
antidumping laws for its own national economy, antidumping schemes are sure to run in
an unfair and partial way. Member countries of the WTO are urged to surrender their
authority to operate antidumping mechanisms to the WTO which will operate them for
the shortest period possible before abolishing them and letting safeguard mechanisms
take over the duty of remedying domestic industries injured by import. "' This is a way
for the world to move in the right direction, allowing every country to prosper in the
international economy, while becoming more interdependent trading partners with each
other.
^^^ See, Benz, supra note 22, at 7 1 0.
^^^
Fisher, .vM/7/-a note 43, at 88
^^'*
See, Bailey, supra note 57, at 446-48, stating further that forcing open the exporter's home market
would raise the economic welfare of the exporting country by reducing output of the dumped article,
eliminating dumping abroad and expanding production of something else, in short, by optimizing the
allocation of resources
^^^ This proposal should be discussed at the forthcoming New Round of trade talk commenced in
December 1999 in Seattle. See, supra note 7
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